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How do time constraints a¤ect household expenditures? How productive are
household time expenditures, and how do spouses jointly make decisions over
time activities?
In this thesis I present three essays on the family, time, and household
decision making. In the rst essay, I ask: What is the time and goods cost
of child? Understanding the substitution between time and market goods is
increasingly important as incomes increase and available time does not. In
this study, I estimate household demands for time and market goods used in
v
caring for children. To construct a data set with time and market goods, I map
information from the American Time Use Survey and the Current Population
Survey into the Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey for single women
and single women with one or two children. I also construct inter-area price
indexes to obtain su¢ cient price variation for estimation. With these price
measures and proxies for the value of single parentstime, I estimate household
commodity input demands and the cost of a child, holding utility constant. I
also report price, cross-price, and income elasticities for time and goods inputs
into child care.
In the second essay, I ask: What is the return to volunteering? A house-
holds choice to donate time depends on the productivity of volunteering, yet
measuring the productivity of volunteering is elusive because the productivity
of volunteers is di¢ cult to quantify. I use di¤erences in studentstest scores as
a proxy for the productivity of classroom parent volunteers. After correcting
for biases due to the endogeneity of volunteers, I nd that volunteers increase
their childs rst grade reading test scores by 12 percent. In addition, teachers
assign volunteer parentschildren higher grades than non-volunteer parents
children.
The nal essay attempts to understand how couples make decisions.
This is a joint work with my colleague, Jungmin Lee. Using individual bank
account data from South Korea, where joint accounts are rare and the legal
system emphasizes the individuality of nancial transactions, we examine the
distribution of nancial resources between spouses within households. We nd
that each members share of household savings depends on the balance of
bargaining power. We also nd that an increase in a wifes bargaining power
increases total household savings. These ndings deviate from the traditional
vi
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As far back as societies of hunters and gatherers, families and household pro-
duction have been the source of economic success or failure. It is ironic that the
rst forms of household production were very time intensive, yet for the past
century economists have focused on the goods allocation and goods consump-
tion of households instead of the time allocation and the time consumption of
households. In the following three chapters I present research on the behavior
of families. In the rst chapter, I consider the time and goods cost of children,
in the second, the e¤ectiveness of volunteering in a childs classroom, and in
the third, the process through which families make decisions.
For decades, economists have estimated the market goods cost of chil-
dren; however, the largest cost of raising children is not in terms of dollars,
but in terms of hours. In this essay, I ask, What is the time and market goods
cost of children? I also characterize how households substitute time for market
goods. Understanding substitution between time and market goods is becom-
ing increasingly important as incomes increase but available time does not. I
estimate household demands for time and market goods with the Linear Ex-
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penditure System. To construct a data set with time and market goods, I map
information from the American Time Use Survey and the Current Population
Survey into the Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey for single women
and single women with children. To obtain su¢ cient price variant, I construct
inter-area price indexes. With these price measures and proxies for the value
of single parentstime, I estimate household production input demands and
the cost of children via equivalence scales. I also report price, cross-price, and
income elasticities for time and goods household inputs.
In the second essay, I ask: What is the return to volunteering? A house-
holds choice to donate time depends on the productivity of volunteering, yet
measuring the productivity of volunteering is elusive because the productivity
of volunteers is di¢ cult to quantify. I use di¤erences in studentstest scores as
a proxy for the productivity of classroom parent volunteers. After correcting
for biases due to the endogeneity of volunteers, I nd that volunteers increase
their childs rst grade reading test scores by 12 percent. In addition, teachers
assign volunteer parentschildren higher grades than non-volunteer parents
children.
The nal essay covers the di¢ cult task of understanding how spouses
make decisions where each may exert pressureto obtain their desired out-
come. In this paper with Jungmin Lee, a fellow graduate student at the time,
we ask, Do di¤erences in individual bank account holdings a¤ect how much
households decide to save? Using individual bank account data from South
Korea, where joint accounts are rare and the legal system emphasizes the in-
dividuality of nancial transactions, we examine the distribution of nancial
resources between spouses within households. We nd that each members
share of household savings depends on bargaining power. We also nd that an
2
increase in a wifes bargaining power increases total household savings. These
ndings deviate from the traditional unitary model of the household.
3
Chapter 2
Time and Goods Cost of
Children
2.1 Introduction
What is the cost of a child, including both time and good expenditures? Since
the advent of the eld of economics, economists have been concerned about
the welfare of households. Among households with the greatest needs and con-
cerns of society are those with children. And among households with children,
those often in the most perilous of economic circumstances are single parent
households. Most of our understanding of the costs of children are with regards
to goods expenditures. However, for parents, in particular single parents, the
greatest cost of raising a child is time costs. To understand the full costs of
children, I estimate the time and goods expenditure cost of a child.
The theory of including time in household demands begins with Becker
(1965). Since Beckers work, many others have stressed that in order for house-
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holds to consume market goods, or raise children, they must also consume time
(Pollak and Wachter, 1975; Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1987; Montmarquette
and Monty, 1987; Robinson, 1987; Juster and Sta¤ord, 1991; Gustafsson and
Kjulin, 1994; Apps and Rees, 2001; Hamermesh and Lee, 2007). For some
commodities, such as general health, the absence of information about time is
less deleterious to a household demand system than for commodities that are
more time intensive, such as relaxing and child care (Gronau and Hamermesh,
2006). Because a large cost of raising children is time, estimates of the cost of
children based only on market goods are grossly underestimated.
In addition to including time in calculating the cost of children, I also
include price variation for time and market goods. Comparable prices across
regions are generally not available to researchers. Though the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) reports price indices for various goods and regions that are
comparable across time within a region, these indices are not comparable across
regions. With a BLS report that constructs region comparable price indices
for the period July 1988 to June 1989 (Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton, 1994),
I create price indices that are comparable across regions.
These two novelties, the inclusion of time and regional price variation,
identify additional variations in household welfare. Estimates of the cost of
a child based on these innovations are more accurate than previous estimates
and allow policy makers to customize welfare policies according to di¤erences
in household time constraints and prices.
I nd that the time and goods cost of a child is about 90 percent of the
time and goods cost of a single mother reference household. I nd that the
quarterly time and market goods cost of a child is $16,044 for a single mother
whose quarterly time and goods cost is $17,546. I also separately estimate
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the time and the goods cost of a child. As reported in other studies, I nd
that the goods cost of a child is about 20 percent of the goods cost of a single
mother. These results suggest the importance of parental visits and including
time costs in alimony payments and welfare planning. In short, the goods cost
of raising a child pale in comparison to the time costs.
In the next section, I discuss a theory of household demands over time
and goods. Following Section 2.2, I explain the estimation strategy in Section
2.3 and the data sets in Section 2.4. The results are in Section 2.5 followed by
concluding thoughts and remarks in Section 2.6.
2.2 Theory
Beckers (1965) theory of the allocation of time suggests that households use
time and market goods to produce household commodities that are jointly
consumed by households. The distinction is that households do not consume
food and food preparation time separately, but that they consume what these
two inputs produce together a meal.
Accompanying the production of a commodity is the implicit price of
that commodity. Pollak and Wachter (1975) note that in order to apply re-
sults from demand theory to household production, commodity prices must
be independent of preferences and the household production technology that
generates the commodities. One case where commodity prices are indepen-
dent of preferences and technology is a household that produces commodities
with a constant returns to scale technology and exhibits no joint production.
With these assumptions, and a measure of the commodities produced by the
household, commodity demands can be estimated and implicit prices can be
6
calculated.1
Pollak and Wachter (1975) suggest two formulations for household util-
ity with time goods. The rst follows Beckers paradigm that households
consume commodities which are produced through a household production
function. The other approach is that households have preferences over input
demands. Though not as theoretically clean as the rst, this formulation does
bypass rather strong assumptions that must be placed on the production func-
tion in order to separate preferences and technology from entering commodity
prices. For both theoretical frameworks, the demand system below represents
the demand for time and goods inputs.
2.2.1 Household Activities
The study of the allocation of time and market goods rather than the de-
mand for time and goods relaxes the requirement of commodity measures and
constraints on the household production technology (see Pollak and Wachter,
1975, Section 5.b). Suppose there exists a mapping from U (z) ; a households
utility function over household commodities, and W (y; t) ; a households util-
ity function over time and market goods. This assumption, in essence, sup-
presses the household production function into the household utility function.
Instead of a utility function over commodities, there is a utility function over
activities where an activity is a pair-wise combination of time and goods. For-
1Measures of household commodity production, however, are not readily available. For
instance, information on the number of meals that a household produces is not commonly
found in expenditure data sets. Even if this type of information were available, the quality
of one meal may di¤er from the quality of another meal. One possible measure of household
commodities are quality-quantity indices, such as health, education, and well-being indices.
Demands and implicit prices for these goods are some household commodities that could be
readily estimated with existing data sets.
7
mally, the household solves









ts  I + wT (2.2)
where y and t are market goods and time inputs, respectively, p is the price of
a market good, w is the market wage, I is non-market income, T is total time
available, s indexes activities, and k indexes market goods. In this framework,
time enters the utility function like a market good and the household problem
is a generalization of a typical labor-leisure problem. Note that this expression
of the budget constraint allows for multiple market goods to be combined with
time for an activity, but that multiple uses of time for a unique activity is not
allowed. The existence of these demand functions depends on the ability to
distinguish the use of good k in activity s from its other uses and being able
to partition activities in the day.
In the model presented above, the price of time for all time activities
is the opportunity cost or the forgone wage. This assumes that the household
could work any amount of additional hours, which is far from an innocuous
assumption (Hamermesh, 1998). For example, the opportunity cost of reading
a book late Friday night because you cannot sleep is not your hourly wage; it
is less. Assuming a constant wage over-estimates the total value of all time
activities.2
2A valuation methodology for the price time is to assign the price that one would pay
to purchase the same activity in the market. For example, the price of cleaning a home is
the cost to hire someone to clean the home. This valuation of time, on the other hand, does
not consider the utility derived from time activities.
Kimmel and Connelly (2006) consider a similar problem: Is a mothers time with her
child labor or leisure?
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A constant price provides little information for why choices are made
among di¤erent time activities. All explanatory power for why certain time
activities are chosen over others is then generated from di¤erences in goods
prices and preferences, not from di¤erences in time prices. The practical prob-
lem with a constant value of time is that without variation in the price of
time, time activity demands cannot be estimated in a typical demand system
framework.3
To allow for the value of time to vary, I consider the constraint:
pff + phh+ poo++wl + wcc+ pss = I + wh+ wl + wcc; (2.3)
where f; h; o; l; c; and s denote food, housing, all other goods expenditures,
leisure, child care, and savings (or dis-savings if s < 0), respectively. The
hourly wage is w and the price of child care is the market wage for child
care services, wc:4 This constraint does not follow from equation 2.2 and side-
steps the important issue of how time activities enter the budget constraint.
However, it does allow for the choice of leisure and child care time activities
to be determined by di¤erences in prices, and it allows these ve goods: food,
housing, other, leisure, and child care, to be estimated in a typical demand
system framework.5
3For an analysis of child care time using a constant value of time, see Bradbury (2005).
4Think of households as being both suppliers and demanders of child care services.
5What is missing from the theoretical model that would allow typical demand systems
and prices to determine time activity choices are di¤erences in productivity. For example,
the rst hour of collapsing on the sofa and watching TV after working a 10 hour shift of
framing a construction home does not substitute for the rst hour of work at the construction
site.
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The constraint in equation 2.3 can also be written as
pff + phh+ poo++wl + wcc = (I   pss) + wh+ wl + wcc (2.4)
= A+ wh+ wl + wcc
= A+ w (T   c) + wcc:
The right-hand side represents full income and the left-hand side represents
full expenditures.6 The inclusion of wcc on the right and left-hand side of
the budget constraint represents the idea that child care is just like a second
job, one that is both supplied (the right-hand side) and demanded by the
household (left-hand side). An alternative is to exclude child care time from
the total time available, T: This, however, removes child care from the set of
consumption goods, whereas the constraint written as above allows the choice
of the amount of child care to be inuenced by preferences.
As Thompson (2004) and others note, full expenditure is not exoge-
nous. Thompson suggests including an additional equation in the demand
system with total expenditures as the dependent variable and income, overall
prices, and macro economic indicators as other determinates. He also notes
that traditional elasticities are also not correct because as prices change full
expenditure also changes. With expenditures dened as above, as a function
of the wage, this observation is all the more consequential.
6I use the term full income and full expenditure to denote incomes and expenditures that
account for the value of time.
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2.3 Estimation Strategy
I use the Linear Expenditure System (LES) to estimate household demands.
The LES is restrictive, but it is also econometrically straightforward to obtain








wherem is full income, pk is the price for good k; and ak and bk are parameters
to be estimated. Applying Roys identity yields the Marshallian demand for
good i:




































for a given level of level, u:
One way to include demographic characteristics is through translation
(Pollak and Wales, 1978, 1981). The original demand system for good i;
xi = h
i (p;m) ; is replaced with, hi (p;m) = gi + hi (p;m 
P
pkgk) : Sim-
ilarly, the indirect utility function, V (p;m) ; is replaced with V (p;m) =
V (p;m 
P
pkgk). Demographic variation enters the demand system through
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gi. If gi equals the number of persons in the household, this specication al-
lows the e¤ect of gi to vary by each commodity. By extension, gi may be a
vector of demographics. In the case of two goods and three demographics, g1,
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1 + 11d1 + 12d2 + 13d3) + p2 (b

2 + 21d1 + 22d2 + 23d3)
m

where g1 = i1d1; g2 = i2d2; and g3 = i3d3:
Each additional demographic variable increases the number of para-
meters to be estimated by the number of goods in the demand system. I
experiment with three child age groups for all possible combinations of zero
to two children.7 This adds 9  I parameters to be estimated, where I is the
number of demands. Reasonable parameter estimates are di¢ cult to obtain in
such a large parameter space. To restrict the number of parameters, I assume
that the demographic parameters are constant across share demand equations.
Though this restricts the variation by goods across family compositions, it al-
lows greater exibility for economies of scale.
An alternative is to reduce the number of demographic variables by
7There are 9 combinations. For example, one young child, one middle child, one older
child, two young children, one young child and one middle child, one young child and one
older child, etc.
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only using three demographic variables, where each variable represents the
number of children in each of the three age groups. However, note that using
a dummy variable for each family composition type adds more exibility. With
three age groups, young, middle, and old, each group may have zero, one, or
two children. With this specication, and with more than one child in the
household, economies of scale are constant within each age group. That is, an
additional child in any age group requires the same amount as the rst child
in that age group. For goods, this maybe permissible; but for time especially
for child care time activities this is entirely unreasonable.
I consider demand systems separately for goods, time, and time and
goods. The former two systems, goods and time, are mis-specications of the
true model, since neither can be consumed without the other.8












where i denotes either goods, time, or time and goods, and bi = bi + d: I
allow the error terms, "i, to be correlated across share demand equations by
employing Zellners Seeming Unrelated Regression methodology (Zellner, 1962;
Zellner and Huang, 1962; Zellner, 1963). For each of these systems, I use the
estimated parameters to calculate the indirect utility and the cost function
for the reference household, a single mother. With the reference household
utility, I use the demographic variables to calculate the cost function for each
8For more on the joint consumption of goods and time see Becker (1965).
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household type. These calculations lead to the equivalence scales
Erj =
cr (pr; ur; dj)
cr (pr; ur; 0)
(2.12)
where cr (:; :; :) is the LES expenditure function, price and utility are at the
reference household levels, and dj represents the demographic translating e¤ect
of the jth household composition on the reference households expenditure.
2.4 Data
To measure the time and market good cost of a child, I use the 2003 and 2004
American Time Surveys (ATUS), the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Interview
Survey (CEX), and various years of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). I par-
tition time use into four categories: work, sleep, child care, and leisure, and
impute these categories into the CEX from the ATUS. Since the ATUS con-
tains time information on only one individual in the household, I consider only
single-headed households in both the ATUS and the CEX. As a price of an
individuals time, I impute a wage rate based on the 2003 and 2004 Current
Population Surveys (CPS). To compute the price of household child care, I im-
pute the wage rate of the individual as if they were in the child care industry.
To construct price indices that have variation across areas, I construct area
comparable price indices with the CPI and a report by the BLS with detailed
information on prices levels (Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton, 1994). I describe
these data sets below.
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2.4.1 American Time Use Survey
The ATUS began in 2003 and will continue indenitely under the direction of
the BLS.9 The 2003 ATUS included 20,720 households and the 2004 survey in-
cluded about half that number households, 13,973. Respondents in the ATUS
were sampled from groups rotating out of the CPS. One individual over the
age of 15 of the selected outgoing household completed a time diary for a day
of the week beginning at 4 AM and ending at 4 AM the next day. The sam-
pling scheme over-sampled weekends: 25 percent of the time diaries cover each
weekend day, and 10 percent of the diaries account for each weekday day.10
In addition to recording time use activities in one of 441 categories, respon-
dents also recorded where the activity occurred and who was present during
the activity.11 The BLS also collected information on secondary activities if
the secondary activity was child care.
Like the ATUS, goods expenditure data in the CEX are collected from
one person in the consumer unit, but cover the entire consumer unit.12 In order
to match time use information with goods information, I consider only single-
headed households and children in those dwelling units.13 I restrict the sample
9Between time and market goods, the most expensive thing that we spend is our time.
In spite of this fact, the availability of time use surveys relative good expenditure surveys
is sparse. See Abraham (2005) for an excellent description of the nascent eld on time use.
For more information about the ATUS see Hamermesh, Frazis, and Stewart (2005).
10All ATUS results are weighted by day of the week to account for this fact.
11The 441 categories are organized into 3 tiers.
For personal activities, the BLS does not collect information on where an activity takes
place and who was present. Personal activities are: sleeplessness, sleeping, washing, dressing
and grooming oneself; grooming health-related self care, other self care, personal/private
activities, other personal activities, personal emergencies, personal care emergencies, and
other personal care.
12The respondent in the CEX, however, reported the expenditures for all of the persons
in the consumer unit.
13I do not consider how children spend their time. See Apps and Rees (2001) for a
household approach that assumes a utility function for each individual in the household,
15
to households that could have children, those between the ages of 18 and 65,
and exclude children if they have any marital status other than never married.
In additional to ones children, I also include foster children and ones own
non-household children, but I exclude ones grandchildren and other relatives.
From the 441 possible categories, I dene an individuals time use into four
categories: work, sleep, child care, and leisure.14
My denition of child care time is broader than the child care denition
in the ATUS questionnaire. In addition to activities identied as child care
related in the ATUS, I also include activities where a child under the age of
18 is present and there are no other adults present other than the respondent.
Is this broader denition of child care too generous? Perhaps. But if so,
then the results that follow may be interpreted as upper bounds. However,
this upper bound is what has been missing from the literature on the cost of
children. For decades, economists have estimated the market good cost of a
child and excluded the larger, and perhaps harder to substitute, time costs.
By excluding time costs, welfare transfers are implicitly expected to cover the
entire cost of a child, when in fact it may be the time spent with a child is the
more important expenditure in raising a child, and not just the time spent,
but time spent with all of the goodunobservables.
Single households with a child and single households without a child
di¤er along important and expected dimensions (see Table 2.1). A typical
single parent is a black young women, is employed, and has less than average
level of education. Seventy-two percent of single parents are women. More
including children.
14Instead of the category leisure I experimented with two exhaust and mutually exclusive
catergories, adult care and leisure. Both of these categories moved in the same direction in
nearly all of the conditional means. To simpliy the imputations, I combined both of these
categories into one.
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single parents are employed than single adults without children 82 and 74
percent, respectively. Single parents are less educated than other singles and
are more likely to be divorced or separated.
The presence of a child in single-headed households reduces leisure time,
but work and sleep times remain unchanged. The percent of a day spent in
each of the four time categories, given the presence of child, is in Column
2, Table 2.2a.15 Households without a child spend about 50 percent of the
day in leisure time, 35 percent of the day sleeping, and 15 percent of the day
working.16 Households with a child spend 30 percent of the day in leisure and
15 percent of the day in child care time.17
For single female, but not for male headed households, child care time
decreases as the age of the child increases (Row 1 in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b,
respectively). Single women spend 20 percent of their time in child care if their
child is younger than 7 years old. They spend 10 percent of their time in child
care if their child is older than 13. Men, however, consistently spend about 15
percent of their time with their child. Nursing and infant care may explain the
relatively large amount of time that women spend with their young children,
but it is unclear why time spent with older children decreases for women below
the amount of time spent by men with children.18
15These statistics are weighted by the day of the week. The time shares represent the
average time share for an average day of the week of the observations in that cell.
16Leisure time is dened as personal time, housework, eating, drinking, watching TV, etc.
17Drawing on various studies, Crittenden (2001) claims that the presence of a child reduces
a mothers time for all other time activities except for paid work time.
18Systematic patterns are not evident in time shares by income categories. This may be
because incomes do not necessarily map into the opportunity cost of individuals if incomes
are not solely determined by wages and salaries but instead include transfer payments and
non-labor income.
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Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Gender (1=Male) 0.47 0.007 0.18 0.006
Age 46.60 0.704 37.88 1.252
Race
White 0.75 0.011 0.71 0.024
Black 0.20 0.003 0.24 0.008
Other 0.05 0.001 0.04 0.001
Region
Northeast 0.20 0.003 0.18 0.006
South 0.36 0.005 0.37 0.012
Midwest 0.24 0.004 0.24 0.008
West 0.20 0.003 0.20 0.007
Marital Status
Married - Spouse Absent 0.02 0.000 0.02 0.001
Widowed 0.09 0.001 0.05 0.002
Divorced 0.38 0.006 0.44 0.014
Separated 0.05 0.001 0.12 0.004
Never Married 0.45 0.007 0.37 0.012
Child's Gender (1=Male) -- -- 0.51 0.017
Child's Age -- -- 9.24 0.306
Education
HS or less 0.35 0.005 0.39 0.013
BA or some college 0.51 0.008 0.54 0.018
Graduate work 0.13 0.002 0.07 0.002
Employment Status
Employed 0.74 0.011 0.82 0.027
Unemployed 0.04 0.001 0.05 0.002
Not in Labor Force 0.21 0.003 0.13 0.004
$36,903 $597 $31,256 $1,087
Number of Observations
No Child Present One Child Present
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics on Single-Headed Households in the 2003 and
2004 American Time Use Surveys
Note: Information on Total Annual Income is missing for a few observations.
4,376 915
Total Annual Income (before taxes)
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Activity No Children One Child 0 - 7 8 - 12 13 - 17
Child Care 0.20% 15.6% 21.0% 14.9% 9.1%
Leisure 48.8% 32.3% 27.5% 33.4% 37.4%
Work 15.5% 16.1% 14.3% 16.6% 17.9%
Sleep 35.4% 36.1% 37.2% 35.1% 35.6%
Number of Observations 2321 751 295 240 216
Note: These data are from the 2003 and 2004 American Time Use Survey. The
total number minutes in a day is 1440. The statistics are weighted by the day of
the week (i.e. Sunday, Monday, ..., Saturday).
Table 2.2a: Daily Time Shares for Single Female-Headed Households With No
Children, With One Child, and by Age of Child
Age of Child
19
Activity No Children One Child 0 - 7 8 - 12 13 - 17
Child Care 0.36% 14.1% 14.2% 14.5% 13.6%
Leisure 47.2% 33.7% 31.4% 35.7% 33.0%
Work 17.5% 17.4% 20.4% 15.1% 18.0%
Sleep 34.9% 34.8% 34.0% 34.8% 35.5%
Number of Observations 2055 164 41 66 57
Note: These data are from the 2003 and 2004 American Time Use Survey. The
total number minutes in a day is 1440. The statistics are weighted by the day of
the week (i.e. Sunday, Monday, ..., Saturday).
Table 2.2b: Daily Time Shares for Single Male-Headed Households With No
Children, With One Child, and by Age of Child
Age of Child
20
2.4.2 Consumer Expenditure Survey
The goods expenditure data set I use is the 2003 CEX. The 2003 CEX contains
cross-sections on ve quarters: 1st Quarter 2003 through 1st Quarter 2004.
Though the same individual or consumer unit may appear in a following quar-
ter, the sampling scheme allows one to combine all of the cross-sections into
one pooled sample. I use the same restrictions and denitions that I described
above for the ATUS.
In the summary statistics, the ATUS and the CEX are remarkably
similar (see Table 2.3). As in the ATUS, the average age of a single parent
is 38, the average childs age is 9, and 51 percent of the children are boys. A
typical single parent has the same education, employment, and race prole as
in the ATUS: black, employed, and below average level of education.
Budget share decreases and increases for households with one child ver-
sus households without a child follow expected patterns (see Tables 2.4a and
2.4b). Households with one child spend more of their budget on food at home,
child care, childrens apparel, and shelter, than households without a child.
The greatest increase in expenditures is in food at home followed by child
care. For fathers, the greatest increase in expenditures is the opposite: child
care followed by food at home. These increases come from reductions in al-
cohol, cash contributions, and other apparel. Moving from lesser to higher
income categories, child care expenditures increase for single mothers and de-
crease for single fathers. For both mothers and fathers, expenditures on food
and apparel decrease as incomes increase. In aggregate expenditure categories,
however, single mothers and single fathers have similar budget allocations.19
19Expenditure shares by a childs gender are very similar, thus suggesting that there is
not a goods expenditure gender bias. For evidence on gender biases in Asian cultures see
21
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Gender (1=Male) 0.54 0.006 0.21 0.007
Age 40.17 0.445 38.07 1.193
Race
White 0.80 0.009 0.73 0.023
Black 0.13 0.001 0.25 0.008
Other 0.06 0.001 0.03 0.001
Region
Northeast 0.18 0.002 0.16 0.005
South 0.32 0.004 0.35 0.011
Midwest 0.23 0.003 0.25 0.008
West 0.26 0.003 0.24 0.007
Marital Status
Married - Spouse Absent 0.03 0.000 0.04 0.001
Widowed 0.07 0.001 0.04 0.001
Divorced 0.29 0.003 0.49 0.015
Separated 0.05 0.001 0.11 0.004
Never Married 0.57 0.006 0.32 0.010
Child's Age -- -- 0.51 0.016
Child's Gender (1=Male) -- -- 9.72 0.305
Education
HS or less 0.31 0.003 0.39 0.012
BA or some college 0.59 0.007 0.54 0.017
Graduate work 0.10 0.001 0.06 0.002
$25,871 $286 $27,670 $867
Total Annual Expenditures $24,834 $275 $29,126 $913
Number of Observations
No Child Present One Child Present
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics on Single Headed Households in the 2003
Consumer Expenditure Survey
8,164 1,018
Total Annual Income (before taxes)
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Activity No Children One Child 0 - 7 8 - 12 13 - 17
Expenditures Mean $5,798 $6,614 $5,622 $6,835 $7,521
S.E. 81 182 270 328 337
Budget Shares
Food at Home 8.81% 11.57% 13.03% 11.07% 10.73%
Food Away 3.37% 3.28% 2.79% 3.10% 3.79%
Child Care 0.02% 2.18% 5.45% 1.44% 0%
0.49% 0.35% 0.19% 0.44% 0.43%
Boys' Apparel 0.07% 0.38% 0.46% 0.42% 0.29%
Girls' Apparel 0.08% 0.70% 0.62% 0.84% 0.66%
Toys and Play Equipment 0.23% 0.54% 0.95% 0.54% 0.22%
Women's Apparel 2.24% 1.35% 1.20% 1% 1.52%
Shelter 25.80% 26.39% 25.13% 27.91% 26.38%
All Other Expenditures 58.89% 53.26% 50.17% 52.96% 55.95%
Number of Observations 3,758 806 309 210 287
Note: These statistics are from the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Quarters
1-4 in 2003 and Quarter 1 in 2004. Each cell is the budget share of those in the
cell. Each budget share is based on expenditures over one quarter.
Table 2.4a: Budget Shares for Single Female-Headed Households by Number of





Activity No Children One Child 0 - 7 8 - 12 13 - 17
Expenditures Mean $6,559 $9,819 $9,077 $9,990 $10,211
S.E. 92 503 768 1204 754
Budget Shares
Food at Home 8.41% 9.37% 9.64% 9.12% 9.33%
Food Away 4.86% 4.28% 3.95% 3.49% 4.82%
Child Care 0.06% 1.59% 4.51% 1.46% 0%
0.29% 0.37% 0.45% 0.52% 0.25%
Boys' Apparel 0.05% 0.33% 0.24% 0.52% 0.28%
Girls' Apparel 0.04% 0.36% 0.51% 0.46% 0.24%
Toys and Play Equipment 0.18% 0.49% 0.53% 0.71% 0.36%
Women's Apparel 0.10% 0.11% 0.08% 0% 0.18%
Shelter 23.88% 21.15% 20.09% 19.65% 22.42%
All Other Expenditures 62.13% 61.97% 59.99% 64.06% 62.12%
Number of Observations 4,406 212 64 47 101
Note: These statistics are from the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Quarters 1-
4 in 2003 and Quarter 1 in 2004. Each cell is the budget share of those in the cell.
Each budget share is based on expenditures over one quarter.
Table 2.4b: Budget Shares for Single Male-Headed Households by Number of






Except for work time, information on time expenditures is not included in the
CEX. Without information on time, information on the largest component of
full expenditures is not available. To create a data set with both time and
goods expenditure information, I impute leisure time for each individual in
the CEX from the ATUS, using variables common to both data sets.
To do this, I assume sleep time is constant for all individuals and use the
constraint that all activities must sum to the total amount of time available
in a day, 1440 minutes.20 Sleep times across households with and without a
child, and across the ages of a child, vary only slightly (see Row 4, Table 2.5
). The average amount of daily sleep time is 520 minutes, or about 35 percent
of a day. Households with the highest amount of sleep are single households
with young children: 535 minutes or 37 percent of the day. Households with
the least amount of sleep are singles without children and singles with an older
child: 518 minutes or 36 percent of the day.
Lee and Paik (2006).
20Work time in the CEX is reported in weekly hours, time activities in the ATUS are








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As the human body requires sleep in order to function, over periods of
time, the amount of time one sleeps is constant, although increases in child
care or work time may temporarily decrease sleep time.21 Because sleep time
does not vary, and to avoid adding more measurement error to the imputations
and nal data, I assume that all individuals in the CEX sleep on average of
520 minutes a day or 36.1 percent of a day. This leaves two remaining time
categories to impute into the CEX: leisure time and child care time. (Recall
that work time is in both the ATUS and the CEX and hence does not need to
be imputed.)
Imputing leisure time is not straightforward. A kernel density estimate
of leisure time in the ATUS shows that its distribution is bimodal. By sorting
individuals by full-time work status, the distribution splits into two unimodal
distributions. With this partition of the data, I impute leisure time by regress-
ing leisure in the ATUS on variables common to both the ATUS and the CEX.
These variables include: race, marital status, age, education, age of child, gen-
der of child, education of child, weekly work time, and occupation. I regress
leisure separately by presence of child and employment status.22 23
With the estimates from these regressions in the ATUS, I impute the
values for leisure into the CEX. As is often the case with imputations, the
variance of the imputed variable is smaller than the variance of the imputing
variable. To adjust for this, I adjust the variance of the imputed variable in the
21Daily sleep time decisions, on the contrary, do depend on labor-leisure trade-o¤s. For
more on this see Hamermesh and Biddle (1990).
22I split the data by those who work more than (or less than) 325 minutes of work. Other
splits, 300, 350, and 375, yield similar but not identical results.
23An alternative approach is to impute child care time and then calculate leisure time.
This is approach fraught with even more di¢ culty because nearly three-quarter of the ob-
servations for child care time are zeros.
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CEX, leisure, to equal the variance of leisure in the ATUS. With work, sleep,
and leisure time, I then calculate child care time by the adding up condition
that the total minutes in a day equal 1,440. If the sum of those four categories
is larger than 1,440, then I reduce leisure time until the constraint is satised.24
The imputation procedure works well (compare Column ATUS, actual
times, with Column CEX, imputed times, in Table 2.5). Sleep time is xed
at 36.1 percent or 520 minutes. Work time is reported in the CEX, and hence
is not the result of calculations or imputations. Leisure time is imputed and
child care time is the remaining time from the adding up constraint. Given
that work time and sleep time are correct, it is clear that CEX di¤erences
in leisure time are generated mainly from di¤erences in work and sleep time.
Child care time imputations in the CEX are very similar to ATUS child care
values.
To understand how well the imputations are working, I impute back
onto the ATUS and compare the imputed values with the original values to
verify that the imputations of leisure time are reasonable. The means of the
non-imputed leisure times for all households, households without a child, and
households with a child are, respectively: 696, 724, and 581 minutes. The
imputed values back onto the ATUS, with the same right-handside variables,
are, respectively: 706, 737, and 580 minutes. The means for each partition of
the data are very close.
Wage Imputations
To avoid endogeneity of wages, and to generate a wage for non-workers, I
impute wages into the CEX from the 2003 and 2004 Current Population Sur-
24The constraint is exceeded in only a handful of cases.
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vey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group les, otherwise known as the
MORG les (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004b; Feenberg and Roth, 2005).
The 2003-2004 MORG data set has 76,916 households without a child and
45,705 households with a child.25 On the MORG sample, I regress a Min-
cerian wage equation separately for both males and females and by whites
and non-whites. I use a Heckman model to estimate the wages of all heads
of households in the MORG les and then project those estimates onto heads
of households in the CEX. I use information about the child as instruments
and characteristics of the head of household and state dummy variables as
regressors. With the coe¢ cients from these regressions, I predict the wages
for individuals with and without wage information in the CEX.26
I derive time prices from market wages as characterized in the MORG
les. For the price of leisure time, I use the imputed wage from the MORG
les using demographic information in both the CEX and the MORG. For the
price of child care time, I impute what the individual would make if they were
employed in the child care industry.27
A recent report suggests another method for valuing home production:
quality-adjusted replacement cost (see Abraham and Mackie, 2005, page 70).
The idea is that Professor Smith may be a good economist, but he is likely a
terrible plumber. Thus, if Smith was in the plumbing labor market, he would
25In the MORG les, age, sex, and education information are not available for children
under the age of 15.
26As suggested in the MORG documentation, these observations are individuals who are
not self-employed and do not have top-codes for weekly wages. Hourly wages are computed
by dividing weekly wages by weekly hours. For more information about the MORG les see
Feenberg and Roth (2005).
27In the estimation of the demand system, I normalize imputed wages and imputed child
care wages the respect wages of a white female who is, without a child, 30 years old, and a
high school graduate.
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be paid less than the average wage. By the same argument, however, one may
be over qualied for an activity that one does at home, for example, child
care. It is unclear if the quality-adjusted replacement cost method would yield
a lower or higher estimate than the market replacement wage. What may be
more important is distinguishing labor from leisure (Kimmel and Connelly,
2006). Child care time is clearly work, but often times enjoyable work. This is
the paradox that volunteers face: Is volunteering labor or leisure (see Chapter
3 for a discussion of the volunteer labor force)?
Larson and Shaikh (2004) suggest a non-linear relationship between
wages and the value of time, with value of time as a proportion of the wage
but then remaining constant past a $30 an hour wage. Unfortunately, their
sample size is small, 393 individuals, and the leisure activity that they derive
the results from is whale watching (see Table 4 in Larson and Shaikh, 2004).
Goods Prices
For goods prices I use the CPI and internal computations by the BLS. The
CPI describes price variation across time for a given area and for given goods
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004a, pg. 6). If prices are too similar or they do
not vary, then the Hessian matrix can not be inverted and demand estimates
can not be obtained. Because I use only one year of the CEX, the CPI may not
have enough price variation to estimate a demand system. In order to increase
the amount of price variation, I construct indices that are comparable across
areas and time by using the price levels constructed by Kokoski, Cardi¤, and
Moulton (1994) and the CPI price indices from 1989 to 2003.
Though, in general, prices move together across both time and regions,
di¤erences in regional prices are su¢ cient to generate large welfare di¤erences
30
(Slesnick, 2002). Slesnick (2005) discusses the measurement error of assum-
ing that all households in the US faces the same prices. With area and time
comparable price indices and information on goods and time expenditures, a
household demand system for input goods to the household production func-
tion can be estimated. For details about the construction of these prices,
including tables, see the Appendix, Cost of Children section.28
A recent study on prices by Bettina Aten computes 2003 prices lev-
els (Aten, 2005, 2006). These price levels incorporate recent CPI categories
and area denitions. As described in the Appendix with 1988/89 prices from
Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton (1994), I inate the prices levels from Aten
(2005) across areas for 2003 and 2004 to create inter-area comparable prices
indices over the time frame of the analysis. I perform the analyses described
in the Empirical Strategy Section with both these price indices and the prices
indices constructed from Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton (1994). The results I
report in the next section are with the price indices created from Aten (2005),
since they are more recent and have less measurement error than indices based
on Kokoskis 1988/1989 price levels.
2.5 Results
In this section, I discuss implications from the combined time and goods data
set and report the elasticities and equivalence scales I compute with these
data.
28In the estimation, I normalize goodsprices by the United States city average.
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2.5.1 Means
Summary statistics of time and goods expenditures conrm that the largest
cost of a child is child care time (see Table 2.6a), and the most time intensive
age is the 0 - 7 age group (see Table 2.6b). Child care time for a young child
is about 30 percent of full expenditures. On the other hand, child care time
for an older children is about 15 percent of full expenditures, which is half of
the time requirement for a young child. In goods expenditures, the cost of a
younger child appears to be less than that of an older child. This, however, may
be due to heterogeneous income levels, which are not controlled for in these
tables.29 The time component of full expenditures is roughly twice as large
as the goods component. For households with a young child, the leisure time
alone is similar in magnitude to total goods expenditures. These shares are
upper bounds on behavior, as they do not account for the fact that households
may substitute away from more expensive goods to less expensive goods.
29For example, parents with older children are likely themselves to be older and hence















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Own-price demand elasticities for market goods are negative and have the
expected magnitudes (see Tables 2.7a and 2.7b). The own-price elasticities
for food and other goods are similar to LES elasticities computed by Pollak
and Wales (1992, see Tables 1 and 2).30 The own-price elasticity of food is
between -0.627 and -0.796. The own-price elasticity of leisure is between -0.36
and -0.73. The elasticity of child care is smaller for those who work than for
all others. For those with children, the elasticity of child care is -0.213, and for
those with children and are also employed the own-price child care elasticity is
-0.043. In general, the more constrained the household, the smaller are their
own-price elasticities.
These elasticities do not include the e¤ect of a change of wage, or price
of time, on total income. Recall that goods expenditures are nanced through
earned wages, unearned income, and savings or borrowings. A more appropri-
ate elasticity is one that allows for the change in wage to also a¤ect the size of
the goods expenditure component of full expenditures. (See comments in the
Theory Section and Thompson, 2004, for more regarding this point.)
The labor supply elasticities derived from the demand for leisure and
child care are larger than the labor elasticities directly calculated with hour
and wage information from the CEX. For employed households with children,
the labor supply elasticity is 0.40. The labor supply elasticity for the same type
of household in the CEX is 0.12. The di¤erence between these two elasticities
is due in part to household production. The CEX labor supply elasticity is di-
rectly estimated by regressing log hours on a constant term and log wages. The









Food -0.785 0.005 0.111 -0.334 1.00
Housing -0.013 -1.049 0.152 -0.456 1.37
Other Goods -0.020 0.011 -1.391 -0.701 2.10
Leisure -0.006 0.004 0.073 -0.731 0.66







Food -0.796 0.002 0.153 -0.603 1.24
Housing -0.016 -1.015 0.198 -0.783 1.62
Other Goods -0.025 0.005 -1.296 -1.237 2.55
Leisure -0.004 0.001 0.049 -0.449 0.40
Labor Supply Elasticity 0.82
Labor Supply Elasticity (CEX) 0.35
Table 2.7a: Time and Goods LES Elasticities for Single Female
Headed Households by Presence of Child and Employment












Food -0.705 0.002 0.154 -0.149 -0.156 0.85
Housing -0.025 -1.019 0.228 -0.221 -0.232 1.27
Other Goods -0.047 0.006 -1.477 -0.411 -0.432 2.36
Leisure -0.014 0.002 0.124 -0.674 -0.126 0.69
Child Care -0.005 0.001 0.042 -0.041 -0.231 0.23









Food -0.627 -0.014 0.135 -0.270 -0.212 0.99
Housing -0.038 -0.908 0.199 -0.398 -0.313 1.46
Other Goods -0.069 -0.038 -1.255 -0.726 -0.570 2.66
Leisure -0.011 -0.006 0.056 -0.361 -0.088 0.41
Child Care -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.014 -0.043 0.05
Labor Supply Elasticity 0.40
Labor Supply Elasticity (CEX) 0.12
Table 2.7b: Time and Goods LES Elasticities for Single Female Headed
Households by Presence of Child and Employment
Note: The number of observations for those with a child is 667.
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elasticity calculated using the CEX data set includes the impact of domestic
labor supply and the impact of wages on goods expenditures on market labor
supply. The labor supply calculated from the demand system described above
is calculated from leisure and child care elasticities. These elasticities do not
capture the e¤ect of market labor supply on the amount of market goods than
can be purchase, nor do they acknowledge that domestic labor is necessary to
consume market goods. Thus, part of the di¤erence in the calculated labor
supply and the directly estimated labor supply represent household production
and the full expenditure component of labor supply.
2.5.3 Equivalence Scales
As put forth in the in the Empirical Strategy Section, in this section I report
the equivalence scales for goods, time, and time and goods together. The rst
two specications, equivalence scales based on goods and equivalence scales
based on time, are mis-specied. Neither takes into account that the other is
necessary in order to consume them. The correct specication for household
demand for inputs includes both time and goods.
Similar to other studies (Betti, 1999), the goods cost of a child is about
20 percent of the cost of an adult (see Table 2.8a). The cost of two young
children is 53 percent of the cost of an adult. Two children in the same age
bracket are more expensive than two children in di¤erent age brackets. For
example, two young children require two car seats and perhaps a larger car for
the both of them to ride in. Children who have are further apart in age can






































































































































































































































































































































There are signicant economies of scale with time. The time equivalence
scale for one young child is 1.92, meaning a child costs 92 percent of the costs
for an adult.31 The time equivalence scale for two young children is 1.95,
meaning that two children cost 95 percent of the costs for an adult. Time
watching one young child can easily be spent watching another young child.
One could argue that this result is an artifact of the liberal denition of
child care time that I use. If so, the above represents an upper bound; however,
does not child care include just that, watching or monitoring children? The
question is not just about the denition of child care, but acknowledging that
individuals may do many activities at the same time, and then asking how to
quantify such. For example, watching TV, eating, and surng the Internet,
is an example of where an individual can consume more leisure without using
more time to consume it.
The monetary cost of a child is much greater with the inclusion of time.
With the mis-specied equivalence scale with goods only, a child costs $1,000
per quarter (see the di¤erences between the cost function in Row 1, a single
adult, and Row2, a single adult with a young child, in Column 7, Table 2.8b).
With only time, and not goods, the cost of a child is $11,000 per quarter (see
Row 1 and Row2 in Column 8). The time costs of a child are ten times the
goods cost of a child. The time and goods cost of a child is about $16,000 per
quarter (see Row 1 and Row 2 in Column 9).32
31Apps and Rees (2001) nd similar costs for a child. With some assumptions on household
production, they estimate that the cost of a child is between 80 to 90 percent of the cost of
an adult.
32The fact that the time and goods equivalence scale tracks the time equivalence scale is



















































































































































































































































































































































































































The cost of a child using both time and goods is greater than the sum
of the costs of time and of the costs of goods because of household production.
Equivalence scales based only on time ignore the goods inputs into household
production of a household community, such as a meal. Equivalence scales
based separately on time and goods are lower bounds of the true commodity
cost of a child. Comparing demand systems based separately on time and
goods with a demand system based on time and goods illustrates the im-
portance of acknowledging the household production function in household
consumption.
Equivalence Scales with Di¤erent Prices of Time
Above I assume that the price of leisure time is the imputed wage rate and that
the price of child care time is the imputed wage rate for a child care provider
with the parents age and education. Clearly, these may not be correct. For
example, Larson and Shaikh (2004) show that the value of leisure time is non-
linear, that it departs from tracking the hourly wage for wages higher than
$30. I experiment with prices of time that are proportional to the wage rate
and the child care wage rate. (See Table 2.8b for equivalence scales for time
and goods with di¤erent assumptions on the price of time.)
In the equivalence scales in Column 4, I assume that the price of leisure
time is equal to one-third of the wage rate. With this assumption, the equiv-
alence scales are much larger, and the quarterly monetary cost of a child is
about $17,000, the same as before. Monetary costs remain the same because
child care time costs have not changed, only leisure costs; what will di¤er are
elasticities based on these prices. The equivalence scales are larger because
the percent of full income devoted to child care cost is now much larger, and
42
the percent of full income devoted to leisure time is much smaller. As leisure
time becomes less expensive, the percent of full income devoted to time child
care costs increases.
In Column 5, I dene the price of child care time as one-third the market
rate for child care, and I return the price of leisure to the wage rate. With
this assumption, equivalence scales decrease considerably. Instead of a child
costing 90 percent of an adult, now they cost less than 40 percent of an adult.
Obviously, with a lower time cost of child care, children cost less.33
2.6 Conclusion
I use the Linear Expenditure System to construct equivalence scales using
Pollak and Wales(1978) translation methodology. The demand system and
the method for capturing demographic variation is basic; yet it su¢ ciently
captures the idea that time and goods must be considered together when
estimating the cost of children. With this methodology and data from the
ATUS, CEX, and CPI, I nd that the time costs of a child, holding utility
constant, is more than ten times larger than the goods cost of a child.
In terms of family and child support litigation that draws on calculations
of the time and goods cost of children, the question will be: What is the time
cost of child care? The objective of defendants will be to nd the highest price
for leisure time and the lowest cost for child care time. With the wage as the
33In Column 6, I consider the price of child care time as one-third of the market rate for
child care and the price of leisure as one-third of the wage. The cost function for a household
with no children under these assumptions is the same as under the assumption of only a
reduced price of leisure (see Columns 7 and 9, Row 1). This is because a household with no
children has no child care costs, and thus a change in the price of child care time does not
a¤ect the cost function. For these reasons, the cost of a child in under these assumptions is
the same as in Column 7.
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price of leisure and the price of child care at 1/3 of the market cost for child
care, the quarterly cost of a child for a single mother is $7,000. This is still
seven times the cost of a child calculated with only household expenditures on
goods. It is time, more than goods, which are required for raising children.
2.6.1 Further Research
Extensions to the above include using a more exible demand system, more
exible elasticities, and more metrics of the cost of children.
The LES is a translation of a constant elasticity of substitute utility
function, which may be too simple to characterize household preferences. One
extension is to use the Quadratic Expenditure system (QES). Early on in
this project, I considered the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) with the price scaling method for capturing demographic
variation put forth by Ray (1983). Obtaining reasonable parameter estimates
in this framework was di¢ cult. Computing the Deaton and Muellbauer model
with Pollaks translation methodology may prove more fruitful.34
The elasticities that I presented in this chapter do not account for the
e¤ect of prices on full income. I assumed that the price of leisure was equal
to the wage rate. Therefore, a change in the wage rate not only a¤ects the
price of leisure, but it also a¤ects the total amount of earned income available
to purchase market goods. The change in wage has both a substitution and
income e¤ect.
Another approach to measuring the value of time is to apply a function
to the wage rate. For example, Larson and Shaikh (2004) suggest that the
34Filippini (1995) considers a minimalist approach by looking at electricity consumption.
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value of time is half of the wage rate until the wage rate is $30; after that
the value of time is constant at $15 an hour. This would reduce the value of
leisure time for those with high wages and leave the price of child care time
unchanged. One e¤ect of applying such a function to the value of leisure time
would be higher equivalence scales.
Finally, one could use other methods for measuring demographic e¤ects
on demand. Above, I used the translating method, but there are also a host
of other methods to consider.35
35Pollak and Wales (1981) o¤er a number of di¤erent methods for including demographic
variables in demand analysis
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Chapter 3
The Return to Donations of
Time
3.1 Introduction
Do classroom parent volunteers increase test scores? A large body of re-
search suggests that marginal increases in inputs to education, such as teacher
salaries, student/teacher ratios, and certications, have little if any a¤ect on
test scores, but that home and family environments signicantly do a¤ect test
scores (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld, and York,
1966). It remains unclear how home-based inputs a¤ect test scores when they
are placed inside of a classroom. I estimate the productivity of classroom par-
ent volunteers in elementary schools with rst grade standardized test scores.
These data are from the 1998/99 Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey. In
addition to controlling for family characteristics, I separately identify the ef-
fect of volunteering on the volunteers child and the e¤ect of volunteering on
46
other children in the classroom. I also instrument for the endogeneity of vol-
unteering.
Volunteers are inherently di¤erent than other educational inputs. Vol-
unteers bring with them a host of unobservables that are traditional found
in the home. First, volunteers have di¤erent motivations than do teachers.
Parent volunteers have a longer time horizon of interest in their childs per-
formance whereas a paid employee may only focus on the end of the year or
semester. Second, volunteers are not under the explicit control of teachers or
principals. More so than a teaching aide, they may be perceived by a teacher
as a supervisor or monitor, validating the teaching and administration of the
classroom. Another di¤erence is that teachers and teaching aides are paid.
This may limit the scope of their involvement with a student whereas volun-
teers are often willing to do many tasks that they would not have done if they
were paid.
Many studies have found large e¤ects on test scores originating from
a students home environment (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland,
Mood, Weinfeld, and York, 1966; Hanushek, 1996, 1997) and from unobserv-
ables related to teachers, students, and households.1 Rivkin, Hanushek, and
Kain (2005) found that teachers a¤ect test scores, not through education and
experience, but through their unobservable characteristics. They found this
by using test scores from a panel data set constructed by the Texas Schools
Project. These data contained administrative records on students and teachers
collected by the Texas Education Agency from the 1989-90 school year through
1For a recent survey of the e¤ects of education inputs see Barrow and Rouse (2005).
Krueger (1999) found that smaller class sizes increase student test scores by 4 percentile
points and that teachers and teaching aides only slightly a¤ect test scores. Kruegers paper is
based on the STAR project which randomly assigned 11,600 students, teachers, and teaching
aides to di¤erent size classes from kindergarten through third grade in Tennessee.
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2001-2002. The authors focused on students and teachers in grades 4 through
8 for the school years 1995-1996 to 2000-2001, which gave them approximately
215,000 observations. By di¤erencing across years and classrooms they iden-
tied the e¤ect of teachersunobservable characteristics on test scores. Fryer
and Levitt (2004) found a smaller black-white test score gap than what others
have estimated. These authors used the 1998/99 Early Childhood Longitudi-
nal Survey, which has a large body of information about a students home and
household characteristics, and which I use in this paper. They attributed the
smaller estimate to the large number of home environment control variables
that they included.
In the economics literature, research on parent volunteers is nonexis-
tent. Sociologists and education researchers of parent involvement have found
both small and large, and positive and negative returns to volunteering (for
a summary of this literature see Henderson and Mapp, 2002). Economists
research on volunteering suggests that benets to volunteers in the paid la-
bor market are shortened unemployment spells (Day and Devlin, 1998, 1996;
Chen, 2004) and acquired human capital (Zimmerman, 2004).
I nd that classroom parent volunteers signicantly increase their childs
reading test scores. After instrumenting for the endogeneity of volunteering,
I nd a 12 percentile increase in reading test scores for students whose par-
ents volunteer in the classroom. Without instrumenting for the endogeneity
of volunteering, I nd a 2.5 percentile increase in reading test scores for rst
graders. Boys and students in poorly-behaved classrooms benet more from
their parentsvolunteering than do other students. Boys whose parents volun-
teer gain 15 percentiles in reading and students in poorly-behaved classrooms
gain 13 percentiles. An additional return to volunteering is gains in teacher as-
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sessments. Teachers assess children of parent volunteers 10 percentiles higher
than children with comparable standardized test scores. Not only do children
of parent volunteers learn more, but they also take home higher scores on their
report cards.2
These results suggest that more e¤ort should be spent on increasing
the use of volunteers in schools, which may be opposed by administrators and
teachers if volunteers are perceived as snoopers or watch-dogs (Keates,
September 2, 2005). Since volunteers are by denition those who work with-
out pay, increasing the number volunteers is not as easy as increasing the
number of books in a classroom or increasing a teachers salary. Another im-
plication is the importance of home-based inputs versus school-based inputs
in the education production function. From considering changes in home-
schooling and boarding school rates, it appears that some households have
already come to this conclusion. The number of households involved in the
extreme version of volunteeringhomeschoolingincreased by about 30 percent,
from 0.85 million to about 1.1 million students between 1999 and 2003 (Prin-
ciotta and Bielick, 2006).3 About the same time, between 2001 and 2004,
the enrollment at boarding schoolsthe other extreme, absolutely no parent
volunteeringdecreased about 7 percent, from 40,694 to 37,775 students (Na-
tional Association of Independent Schools, 2002, 2004).
2Ancedotal evidence also suggests that volunteering has a large impact on education
outcomes. Principal David Banks of an all-boy public high school in New York city paired
almost all of his 180 students with mentors. The impact has been, beyond profound
(Tyre, 2006).
Michael Gurin of the Gurian Institute notes that, an older man [volunteer] reminds a
boy in a million di¤erent ways that school is crucial to their mission in life (Tyre, 2006,
pg. 51).
3The most common reasons for homeschooling are concerns about the school environment
(31 percent) and to provide religious and moral instruction (30 percent).
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Next I describe the data and then present the rst empirical model. In
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 I discuss the estimates of the returns to volunteering and
concluding remarks are in Section 3.6.
3.2 Early Childhood Longitudinal Study
The data set I use to measure the educational productivity of volunteers is
the kindergarten and rst grade waves of the Early Childhood Longitudinal
Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-99 (ECLS-K).4 The National Center for
Educational Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education directed
the collection of these data. To identify kindergartners to participate in the
study, the NCES randomly selected 100 counties or groups of counties. The
probability of a particular county being chosen is proportional to the number
of 5-year-olds. They selected schools with kindergarten programs by a similar
weighting scheme. In total, the NCES sampled 1,280 schools and about 23
students in each of these schools for a total of 21,260 kindergartners.5 They
collected data from and about teachers, administrators, parents, and students
twice in the kindergarten year (fall 1998 and spring 1999) and twice in the
rst grade (fall 1999 and spring 2000).
Elementary school data are ideal for observing the e¤ect of volunteering
on test scores. Volunteering rates are higher in elementary schools than in
intermediate or high schools. The ability to identify the e¤ects of volunteer
inputs in the school or classroom decreases as students obtain more education
(Singh, Bickley, Trivette, Keith, Keith, and Anderson, 1995).
4For more information about these data see National Center for Education Statistics
(2004).
5The NCES over sampled Asian children and private school kindergartners.
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I restrict the sample to students who attend a public school, are not in-
volved in a special education program, and do not move during the school year.
Because volunteering for a religious organization is the most common type of
formal volunteering, volunteers at a parochial school may choose to volunteer
for religious reasons rather than to increase their childs test scores.6 Parents
of special education children often have more inuence in school decisions, such
as student-teacher matching, than parents of non-special education children.
Special education programs also often have unusually small class rooms, more
resources, and lower test scores.
In each sampling wave, trained survey administrators conducted a one-
on-one assessment with each student. These assessments lasted for approx-
imately 50-70 minutes. The rst grade cognitive assessment section covered
three areas: reading, mathematics, and science.7 The administrator screened
each child about her knowledge of English. If the child did not pass the Eng-
lish screening test and spoke Spanish then the administrator gave the test in
Spanish. In the rst stage of each assessment section was a routing compo-
nent of 12 to 20 questions spanning a range of di¢ cultly. Based on the results
from the rst stage, the child proceeded to a second stage of low, middle, or
high di¢ culty. The NCES then converted these assessment scores into Item
Response Theory (IRT) scores. An IRT score is an estimate of how the child
would have performed if she had answered each question in each level of dif-
culty. The IRT scores also control for guessing, level of di¢ culty, and how
well a question discriminates among student abilities.
6Individuals who volunteer for a religious organization have systematically di¤erent vol-
unteering behavior than individuals who volunteer for other types of organizations (Musick,
Wilson, and Junior, 2000).
7The three areas in the kindergarten year are language and literacy, mathematical think-
ing, and general knowledge.
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The NCES asked principals, teachers, and parents about volunteer ac-
tivities. Teachers reported if a childs parent volunteered in the classroom
or school during the school year and the percentage of children in the class-
room whose parents regularly volunteered. With regards to the classroom as
a whole, teachers also reported average weekly volunteer hours, instructional
volunteer hours, and non-instructional volunteer hours. School administrators,
like teachers, also reported the percentage of children whose parents regularly
volunteered in the school. An adult in the household reported information
about the households volunteer participation. Survey questions about vol-
unteering di¤erentiated volunteering from other forms of school involvement,
such as participation at an open house, parent teacher organization meeting,
parent-teacher conference, school event, class event, or fund-raising event.
Teachers and households reported similar parent volunteering rates, 46
and 49 percent, respectively. The variable Parent Volunteer (Household Re-
ported) equals 1 if the answer to, Since the beginning of this school year have
you or the other adults in your household volunteered at the school or served
on a committee?is yes and 0 if no. The variable Parent Volunteer (Teacher
Reported) equals 1 if the answer to, During this school year, have this childs
parents/guardians volunteered to help in your classroom or school?is yes and
0 if no.
About 25 percent of teachersresponses about volunteering are not con-
sistent with householdsresponses. Members of the household who respond to
the survey might not recall if they or other household members volunteered
during the school year. Another explanation may be that parents who vol-
unteer outside of the classroom are unobserved by the teacher. The latter
explanation strengthens the assumption that teacher reported parent volun-
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teer statust data identify classroom volunteers and not volunteers in other
parts of the school. Evidence of the nonrandom selection of volunteers previ-
ously described is present in both teacher and household measures of parent
volunteer status.
Families who volunteer are di¤erent than families who do not volunteer
in the classroom. Households that volunteer have more education, more pres-
tigious jobs, and are more likely to have a non-working mother.8 Not only
do the characteristics of volunteers di¤er but the activities that they do with
their child at home also di¤er. Volunteer households on average have more
childrens books at home, read to their child more, tell their child more sto-
ries, and on average parent volunteers are more likely to be seen with their
child at a library or museum than other childrens parents.9
In unconditional means, children of parent volunteers have higher test
scores than other children. Reading test scores of children of classroom parent
volunteers on average are 18 percentiles higher than other children. In math-
ematics, children of volunteers are 23 percentiles higher than other children.
These trends persist throughout all grades and all semesters.
Do parents volunteer because their child is struggling at school? Chil-
dren who have high test scores going into rst grade are more likely to have a
parent who volunteers (see Table 3.1). The headings on each Column, 1,. . . ,
5, represent the spring kindergarten reading score quintle. Those in Column
8WIC and Food Stamp participation is extremely high for both volunteer and non-
volunteer households. This is because many respondents for a households did not know if
they participated in WIC or Food Stamp programs. These were coded as missing and I
account for this in each of the models to follow by including an indicator variable for both
missing WIC and missing Food Stamps information.
9Eighty-eight percent of volunteers and 71 percent of non-volunteers attend an open
house duringthe rst grade school year.
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1 2 3 4 5 All
1 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22
2 0.26 0.36 0.39 0.48 0.50 0.37
3 0.34 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.56 0.47
4 0.46 0.51 0.59 0.63 0.70 0.59
5 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.81 0.74













Note: Numbers in cells are volunteering percentages. For example, the
upper left hand cell is a volunteering rating of 16 percent.
Table 3.1: Volunteering Rates by Reading Spring Kindergarten Scores and
Socioeconomic Measure
Reading Score Quintiles
1 are at the bottom of the class and those in Column 5 are at the top of the
class. The rows are similarly dened but for socioeconomic status (SES). The
volunteering rate of parents whose children are at the bottom of the class at
the end of the kindergarten year is 28 percent. In contrast, the volunteering
rate of parents whose children are at the top of the class is 65 percent. Sim-
ilarly, 22 percent of parents at the bottom of the SES measure volunteer and
74 percent of those in the top SES cell volunteer. Children that are doing well
are positively correlated with parent volunteerism.
3.3 Empirical Model
I follow the standard empirical model in the literature to estimate the e¤ect
of volunteer inputs on test scores (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Barrow and Rouse,
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2005):
Et;i = 0 + 1vt;i + xt;i + EEt 1;i + "t;i; (3.1)
E (") = 0; cov(w; ") = 0; cov(v; ") = 0 (3.2)
where i indexes students in the rst grade school year. A students nal rst
grade test score is represented by Et;i, a students nal kindergarten test score
or beginning rst grade test score is Et 1;i;x is a vector of control variables
that may be reported either in time t or in time t   1, v is a measure of
volunteering, " is a random error term, andw is a vector of all of the right hand
side variables except for v: The coe¢ cients represent point changes in nal rst
grade scores. As a measure of educational outcome, E, I use reading and math
test scores but also experiment with reading and math teacher assessment
scores. For a measure of volunteering, I use a dichotomous parent volunteer
participation variable as reported by teachers. I also experiment with six other
measures of volunteering. In the following Sections, I estimate the coe¢ cient
on volunteering with Weighted Least Squares, Ordinary Least Squares, and
semi-parametrically. In Section 3.5, I relax the assumption on cov(v; ") = 0
and estimate 1 with an instrumental variables approach.
The above model could also have been written with rst di¤erences of
the test scores on the left hand side,
Et;i   Et 1;i = 0 + 1vt;i +  xt;i + t;i; (3.3)
where Et;i   Et 1;i is the test score gains during the rst grade year and the
coe¢ cients represent point changes in test score gains. The estimated coe¢ -
cients on this model are nearly identical to those in equation 3.1; however, the
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coe¢ cients in equation 3.1 are easier to interpret: point gains on the nal rst
grade scores.
The error term, ", is heteroskedastic. Classes in small schools have more
students sampled per class than classes in large schools because the target
number of students sampled at any one school is 24, regardless of school size.
The average rst grade class size is 21 students and the average number of
students sampled in a class is 4 students. To correct the standard errors, I
allow for terms in the variance-covariance matrix to di¤er by each classroom.
Most of the explanatory variables in equation 3.1 are endogenous. My
focus is to determine a cause and e¤ect relationship between volunteering and
test scores and not necessarily a cause and e¤ect relationship for other variables
in the model. The coe¢ cients on the variables in x should be interpreted
as correlations and not necessarily causations. For example, teaching aides
are negatively correlated with test scores (see Table 3.2). The average in
Row 1, Column 2, 71.23, represents the average reading score for students
in classrooms with no regular parent volunteers, but their parent volunteered
at least once during the year, and one teaching aide is assigned to the class.
The next average in Row 1, Column 4, 65.44, is the average score for a similar
student, but two teaching aides are assigned to their class instead of one.d This
may incorrectly suggest that adding a teaching aide to a classroom decreases
average test scores, whereas an additional teaching aide may be assigned to
classrooms with low scores.10
10See Lazears (2001) model for optimal class size with well- and poorly-behaved students,



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4 Return to Volunteering Estimates
The reading test score return to volunteering is large. First I begin with
a naive estimator, WLS, and sensitivity analyses. Next, I consider a non-
parametric estimator of the return to average weekly number of volunteer
hours. Following that, I consider other measures of volunteering and another
measure of education output, teacher assessment scores. In the next Section,
Section 3.5, I model for the endogeneity of volunteering with a General Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator. All of these estimates, both in this Section
and in Section 4, suggest that classroom parent volunteers increase reading
test scores.
As suggested by the summary statistics, the return to volunteering with
no control variables is a 16 percentile increase or a 10 point increase in spring
reading test scores for a student at the middle of the test score distribution (see
Table 3.3, Column 1).11 Much of this gain, however, is due to studentsexit
test scores from kindergarten (see Column 2). Children of parent volunteers
begin the rst grade with higher test scores than other children. In Column
3, I include controls for the number of other volunteers in the classroom and
school.12 In this column the return to volunteering is a 6 percentile increase in
reading test scores. In Column 5, I include a full set of control variables, which
includes all of the control variables also used by Fryer and Levitt (2004).13
11In reporting other results, I assume that the student is at the middle of the test score
distribution.
12The rst variable, 1% to 25% of Classroom Parents Volunteer, equals 1 if the percentage
of regular parent volunteers is between 1 and 25 percent, and 0 otherwise. The next variable,
26% to 100% of Classroom Parents Volunteer, equals 1 if the percentage of regular parent
volunteers is between 26 and 100 percent, and 0 otherwise. The omitted group is 0% of
Classroom Parents Volunteer. The other variables, 1% to 25% of School Parents Volunteer
and 26% to 100% of School Parents Volunteer, are similarly dened.
13For a list of the full set of control variables, see the Appendix, Volunteering section.
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With these data Fryer and Levitt found a signicantly smaller estimate of
the black-white test score gap than others have found in the literature. They
attributed this to the large number of home environment control variables that
they included.14 In this column, the return to volunteering is a 2 percentile
increase. In the following analyses, I use the specication in Column 4, which
is based on a smaller set of control variables that yields similar estimates.15
The return to volunteering in Column 4 is a 2.5 percentile increase.
14Indeed, one of their control variables is parent volunteer status.
15The small set of control variables includes: Asian, Black, Socioeconomic Status Score,
Female, Parent Read to Child Every Day, Teacher Hours of Paid Preparation Time, Indi-
vidual Tutoring in Reading, Title 1 Reading Program Participation, Individual Tutoring in


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on an estimator that assumes that volunteering is exogenous,
the return to volunteering is small, but not relatively small. The return to
reducing class sizes from 22 to 15 students is a 6 percent increase in test scores
(Krueger, 2003). Thus, the return to reducing class sizes by 30 percent is the
same return to a parent volunteering in the classroom at least once during the
school year. Considering the cost of both policies, the net return to parent
volunteers is at least comparable, if not greater, than reducing class sizes.
The e¤ect of parent volunteering on math test scores di¤ers from the
e¤ect on reading test scores. The initial estimate of the math test score return
to parent volunteering is a 20 percentile increase in math test scores (see
Table 3.4, Column 1). However, after adding more control variables the return
reduces to a 1 percentile increase (see Column 5).16 Why do the returns di¤er
for mathematics and reading? The answer may simply be that, First grade is
traditionally thought of as the level where children learn to read(PBS, 2006).
16I use the specication in Column 4 for further analyses. The return in Column 4 is a

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In general, the e¤ect of classroom parent volunteers on other children in
the class is smaller than the e¤ect of volunteering on their own children; how-
ever, none of the spillover variables are statistically signicant (see Columns
4 and 5 in both Tables 3.3 and 3.4). Another test for spillover e¤ects is to
regress equation 3.1 separately on the samples of i) students in classrooms
with no regular parent volunteers, ii) students in classrooms with 1-25 percent
regular parent volunteers, and iii) students in classrooms with 26-100 percent
regular parent volunteers (see Table 3.5, Row By Other Parent Volunteers in
the Classroom). These estimates, which are identical to interacting equation
3.1 with n indicator variable for each sample, di¤er in magnitude, but not in
a statistically signicant way.
These results are not alarming. Studies based on the randomly as-
signed student, teacher, and teaching aide project, the STAR project, found
that teaching aides do not have a signicant e¤ect on test scores (Finn and
Achilles, 1990; Word, Johnston, and Bain, 1990; Krueger, 1999). In the worst
case, parent volunteers appear to the other students in the classroom as an
additional teaching aide and hence do not a¤ect test scores. Another reason
why these variables are insignicant may be because of measurement error.
Teachers are asked to identify if each childs parent volunteers and what per-
cent of other parents in the classroom regularly volunteer: none, 1-25 percent,
26-50 percent, 51-75 percent, and 76-100 percent. Because only 5 students
on average are sampled in each class, the information on the number of other
parents who volunteer is less accurate than the information on a parents vol-
unteer status. These results do not suggest that there are no spillover e¤ects,
but rather they do not provide evidence for the contrary.
Though parents volunteer at the same rate for sons and daughters, the
63
Baseline 1.576 (0.395) 0.568 (0.287)
Unweighted 1.598 (0.322) 0.701 (0.251)
By Paid Teaching Aides
None 1.728 (0.610) 0.613 (0.441)
One 1.671 (0.573) 0.406 (0.409)
More than One 1.408 (1.207) 0.257 (1.002)
By Other Parent Volunteers in the Classroom
None 1.651 (0.850) 0.398 (0.683)
1-25% of Parents 1.440 (0.497) 0.286 (0.343)
26-100 % of Parents 2.092 (0.858) 1.475 (0.682)
By Other Parent Volunteers in the School
None -- -- -- --
1-25% of Parents 0.807 (0.488) 0.398 (0.364)
26-100 % of Parents 3.660 (0.816) 1.658 (0.571)
By Gender
Males 2.271 (0.558) 0.924 (0.401)
Females 0.989 (0.562) 0.317 (0.398)
By Base Score
Lower half 0.954 (0.528) 0.424 (0.393)
Upper half 1.803 (0.548) 0.764 (0.400)
By SES quintiles
Bottom -1.223 (1.020) -0.729 (0.636)
Second 2.246 (0.845) 0.812 (0.618)
Third 1.589 (0.845) 1.336 (0.655)
Fourth 1.666 (0.764) 0.766 (0.576)
Top 1.207 (0.846) -0.068 (0.729)
Table 3.5: Sensitivity Analyses on the Return to Volunteering
Note: Cells are blank if there are less than 100 observations. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Also included in each regression are indicator variables for the percent
of regular classroom parent volunteers, regular school parent volunteers, and a
constant term.
Coefficient on Volunteer Status
Specification Reading Math
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e¤ect on test scores di¤ers by gender of the student (see Table 3.5, Row By
Gender). The test score return for boys is an increase by 4 percentiles and
for girls an increase by 1.5 percentiles.17 The estimates in Table 3.5 are from
estimating equation 3.1 on the sub-sample specied in the left hand column.
These estimates show variation in the e¤ectiveness of parent volunteering and
that the e¤ects of volunteering are generally positive. For most of the estimates
in the Reading column the estimates are also statistically signicant.
In addition to the measures presented above, there are four other mea-
sures on classroom parent volunteering in the data. I substitute each of these
variables for Parent Volunteer as reported by the teacher and report the re-
sults on reading test scores in Table 3.6. The coe¢ cient in Column 1 is the
same as the coe¢ cient in the rst row of Table 3.3, Column 4. The next row
in the table is Parent Volunteer as reported by the parent.
17Lazear (2001) suggested that in a classroom education model where disruption (or lack
thereof) is a public good that the optimal class size for better-behaved students is larger than
the optimal class size for poorly-behaved students . If boys are more disruptive than girls
then the presence or threat of the presence of a parent volunteer may have a larger impact












































































































































































































































































































































































The question asked to parents about volunteering is di¤erent than the
question about volunteering asked to teachers. Parents are asked:
Since the beginning of this school year have you or the other adults
in your household ... volunteered at the school or served on a
committee?
Parent Volunteer as reported by parents identies volunteering for the
school, not necessarily volunteering in the classroom. Teachers, on the other
hand, were asked:
During this school year, have this childs parents/guardians . . .
volunteered to help in your classroom or school?
The question asked to teachers is more likely to identify classroom vol-
unteering than the question asked to parents. Teachers are more likely to see
and report classroom parent volunteers than parent who are volunteering in
other areas of the school. The return to volunteering by the parent reported
measure is smaller than the teacher reported measure because the parent mea-
sure contains less precise information about classroom volunteering.
The return to volunteering with other measures of parent volunteer-
ing, average weekly volunteer hours, instructional volunteer hours, and non-
instructional hours, are also smaller than the teacher reported Parent Vol-
unteer variable. These measure are also too general to identify the e¤ect of
parent volunteering on test scores.
3.4.1 Nonparametric Return to Volunteering Hours
Hanushek (2004) suggested that existing modelling suggests no clear rela-
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tionship between resources and student performance and that a possible
explanation is that the achievement process is a complicated interactive one
such that simple linear additive formulations break down.With a large num-
ber of observations and a continuous measure of volunteerism, average weekly
volunteer hours, I estimate the return to volunteer hours semi-parametrically.
The semi-parametric estimate suggests that volunteer hours are slightly non-
linear and that they have a typical labor productivity prole (see Figure 3.1).
I use a penalized spline estimator to estimate the return to average
weekly volunteer hours. A penalized spline is a spline regression that weights
each spline. The three choice parameters are the smoothing parameter, the
knot locations, and the number of knots. A criterion for choosing the smooth-
ing parameter is to minimize the Mean Square Error (MSE). I minimize the
MSE by the restricted maximum likelihood method.18 I follow Ruppert, Wand,
and Carroll (2003, pg. 126) who suggested choosing the knot location k for






th sample quantile of the unique xi: (3.4)





 number of unique xi; 35

:19 (3.5)
The solid line in Figure 3.1 is the semi-parametric estimate of the return
to volunteer hours. The dotted bands around the estimate are standard error
18Cross-validation (CV) and restricted maximum likelihood (REML) are two methods for
minimizing the MSE. The REML method weights the bias and the variance in the MSE











Figure 3.1: Semi-parametric Estimate of the Return to Average
Weekly Volunteer Hours on Reading Test Scores
Note: The dotted lines are deviations of ± 2 standard errors.
Volunteer Hours
69
bands of 2 standard deviations which is roughly a 95 percent condence
band.20 The tick marks at the bottom of the graph represent the location of
the data. The paucity of tick marks beyond 20 volunteer hours means that
there are relatively few observations of more than 20 volunteer hours. After 25
volunteer hours the standard error bands widen and the curve slopes downward
precipitously.
3.4.2 Teacher Assessment Return to Volunteering
Students take home report cards, not standardized tests.21 If teacher assess-
ments are not completely objective then teachers may thank volunteers for
helping in their classroom by giving higher grades to their children.22 To test
this hypothesis, I regress teacher assessment scores (TE) on the variable Par-
ent Volunteer, the full set of control variables, and the gains in standardized
test scores:
TEt;i = 0 + 1vt;i + xi + EtEt;i + Et 1Et 1;i + "t;i (3.6)
20Strictly speaking these are not condence bands, but in practice they are close approx-
imations.
21Some parents may actually value report card scores more than standardized test scores.
Jacob and Lefgren (2005) found that on average "parents strongly prefer teachers that
principals describe as good at promoting student satisfaction and place relatively less value
on a teachers ability to raise standardized math or reading achievement." Jacob and Lefgren
also found that parents in lower-income schools value standardized test scores more than
parents in higher-income schools.
22Rather than thanking volunteers for volunteering, another hypothesis with a similar
conculsion is that teachers give higher grades to children of volunteers in order to insu-
late themselves from aggressive parents (Gibbs, Bower, August, Berryman, Thomas, Healy,
Kau¤man, McDowell, and Rubiner, 2005).
The name of the child is another source of teacher assessment bias. Figlio (2005) showed
that among children from the same family teachers give lower grades to children with a name
that is associated with a lower socioeconomic status. If the name of a child inuences teacher
assessments then an active parent volunteer is also likely to inuence teacher assessments.
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E (") = 0; cov(w; ") = 0; cov(v; ") = 0 (3.7)
As in equation 3.1, the exit standardized test score is denoted by Et;i, the
entry standardized test score is denoted by Et 1;i, and w is a vector of all of
the right hand side variables except for v:23
Teachers systematically give children of parent volunteers higher as-
sessments than children of parents who do not volunteer. In reading, teachers
assess children of volunteers 0.121 points higher than other students. In math,
teachers assess children of volunteers 0.127 points higher than other students.
In both reading and math, teachers assess children of volunteers about 5 per-
centiles higher than other children in the classroom.24
3.5 Instrumented Return to Volunteering Es-
timates
The variable Parent Volunteer is clearly endogenous. To recognize this in
the model, assume that volunteering is determined by an missing variable,
q (Wooldridge, 2002, Chp. 5). The model expressed in equation 3.1 then
23Teachers assess their students on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest score. The
survey question to teachers is, Overall, how would you rate this childs academic skills in
each of the following areas, compared to other children of the same grade level? Far below
average = 1, Below average = 2, Average = 3, Above average = 4, Far above average =
5.Teachers rate both reading and math skills. The NCES then converted these scores into
continuous Rasch Scores. The Rasch Rating Scale model uses the pattern of ratings on the
items to determine an estimate of the di¢ culty of each item and to place each student on a
continuous ability scale (in this case 1-5)(National Center for Education Statistics, 2002,
pg. 3-19).
24I also experiment by including controls for other parent volunteers. Coe¢ cients on these
variables are small in magnitude and they do not a¤ect the coe¢ cients on other variables.
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becomes
Et;i = 0 + 1vt;i + xt;i + EEt 1;i + qt;i + ut;i: (3.8)
This implies that cov(v; ") = cov(v; q) 6= 0 and that the estimated coe¢ cient
on the variable Parent Volunteer is biased. This expression for the bias is






where ̂1 is the OLS estimator and 1 is the true value of the parameter.
Ex ante, the bias may be either positive or negative. The stereotype
about parents who volunteer is that they are also the type of parents who
work with and encourage their child at home. Thus, any e¤ect of volunteering
on test scores is attributed to unobservable home environment variables such
as encouragement and education expectations and not from volunteering in
the classroom. This case is an example of a positive bias, cov (v; q) > 0 and
 > 0. Lazears model, however, suggests that parents volunteer because of
their childs poor behavior at school and thus cov (v; q) < 0 and  > 0 (Lazear,
2001). In both of these cases, q is a measure parental interest in their childs
education outcome.
To correct for this bias, I use an instrumental variable approach to
estimate the coe¢ cient on the variable Parent Volunteer. The rst and second
stages of the model are respectively
vt;i = 0 +xt;i + zt;i + t;i; (3.10)
Et;i = 0 + 1vt;i + xt;i + EEt 1;i + "t;i: (3.11)
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The conditions for a consistent estimator of 1 are:
cov(z; ") = 0 and  6= 0: (3.12)
I estimate 1 with a GMM estimator with a 1 step optimal weighting matrix
and use the instruments and variables: zt;i, xt;i; Et 1;i; and "t;i; to construct
the moment conditions (Wooldridge, 2002, Chp. 8).
Embarking on the instrument road can be perilous. The challenge is
to nd or construct variables that are conditionally correlated with volunteer-
ing but are not correlated with test scores.25 Three variables that satisfy the
above conditions are: The number of times you have breakfast with your
child during a week,The number of people over the age of 18 in the house-
hold,Did you participate in school fundraising activities last year,and the
interaction of these variables.
The instrumented reading test score return to volunteering is a 12.5
percentile increase (see Table 3.7). An F-test on the rst stage that the in-
strumental variables are jointly equal to 0, H0 :  = 0; is strongly rejected.
With more than one instrument, I can also test with the Hansens J test sta-
tistic for the condition: cov(z; ") 6= 0. I can not reject this hypothesis, which
suggests but is not evidence that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term in the 2nd stage.
25An often used instrument for the choice of the level of education is the distance from


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of Days Eat Breakfast with Parents 0.016 -- 0.014 --
(0.008) -- (0.007) --
Parent Participates in School Fundraisers 0.091 -- 0.087 --
(0.038) -- (0.037) --
Number of Household Member Over Age 18 0.040 -- 0.038 --
(0.017) -- (0.016) --
Over 18*Fundraiser -0.016 -- -0.015 --
(0.016) -- (0.015) --
Breakfast*Fundraiser 0.011 -- 0.012 --
(0.005) -- (0.005) --
Over 18*Breakfast -0.006 -- -0.006 --
(0.003) -- (0.003) --
H0: Instruments = 0; F(6,2716) Critical Value 18.270 -- 18.216 --
P-value 0.000 -- 0.000 --
Hansen's J Test Statistic for Overidentification -- 3.017 -- 13.739
P-value -- 0.697 -- 0.017
R squared 0.193 0.584 0.194 0.595
Number of Observations 6,883 6,883 7,170 7,170
Note: The critical value of the F-statistics that the instruments are jointly equal to zero. The unit of
observation is a student. Non-Hispanic whites are the omitted race category. Test scores are IRT test
scores. A constant term is included in each regression. Robust and classroom clustered standard errors
are given in the parentheses. The null hypothesis of the test for overidentification is that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. The small set of control variables are included in each
regression.
Table 3.7 (Continued): Instrumented Test Score Return to Volunteering of 1st Graders
Why is the bias negative? An extension of Lazears model appears to
explain the selection: parents volunteer because their child is misbehaving,
and similarly, children who are misbehaving receive the greatest benet from
parent volunteers. However, the unconditional correlation between students
misbehavior and parentsvolunteerism is negative. Another explanation, and
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one that is shared among volunteer consultants, is that on average the parents
who choose to volunteer are over-aggressive parents.26 Karen Geiger, a kinder-
garten teacher quoted in a Wall Street Journal article on parent volunteers,
may have put it best when she said,
Ive had colleagues complain that they feel more parents are coming
in with motives that arent always pure: Theyre in there to snoop
or to control how their child is taught.27
The same groups that beneted more than others in the previous Section
also benet more than others with a GMM estimator (compare Tables 3.5
and 3.8). With a GMM estimator, boys gain 15 percentiles and girls gain
9 percentiles on reading test scores. Students who are in classes that are
misbehaved gain more than students who are classes that are well behaved,
given that their parent volunteers. Students in misbehaved classrooms, whose
parents volunteer, gain 13 percentiles and students in well behaved classrooms,
whose parents volunteer, gain 7 percentiles.
As I also did in the previous section, I use a GMM estimator to estimate
the instrumented teacher assessment return to volunteering. The instrumented
teacher assessment return (or teacher bias) to volunteering is about an 11
percentile increase.28
26This point is from personal conversations during fall 2005 with Dr. Sarah Jane Rehn-
borg, volunteerism consultant for the Points of Light Foundation, AARP, and the Corpora-
tion for National and Community Service.
27See Keates (September 2, 2005).
28I use the same instruments as above in these models also. The hypotheses that the
instrumental variables are jointly equal to 0, H0 :  = 0; for both reading and math, are
strongly reject. The hypotheses that H0 : cov(z; ") 6= 0 tested by the Hansens J test
statistic can not be rejected for both reading and math at the 10 percent level, which is














Group misbehaves (very frequently, frequently, occasionally) 7.637 (3.091)
Group behaves (well, exceptionally well) 3.803 (4.183)




Lower half 2.913 (3.714)
Upper half 7.311 (3.282)
Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis on the Instrumented Return to Volunteering






The instrumented return to volunteering is large, but is it too large?
The di¤erence between the WLS estimate and the instrumental variable esti-
mates is similar to other studies on education that instrument for endogeneity.
Butcher and Case (1994) considered the impact of siblings on the educational
attainment of women. They noticed that women that are raised in households
with more male siblings also have higher levels of education attainment. Using
household sex ratios as a instrument, they found that the return to educa-
tion with respect to earnings is double that of the non-instrumented estimate.
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) found an 18 percent return to education af-
ter instrumenting for completed education with information on twins. Card
(1995) found an instrumented return to education that is twice as large as the
non-instrumented estimates by instrumenting for completed education with
geographic proximity to a four-year college.29 Like other studies that instru-
ment for endogeneity, I too nd a much larger estimate with the instrumental
variable approach.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The GMM estimate of the return to volunteering is larger than the WLS
estimate of the return to volunteering. The instrumented return to volunteer-
ing for reading test scores is a 12 percentile increase and the WLS return to
volunteering is 2.5 percentile increase. This large di¤erence in the estimates
is due to the highly endogenous nature of volunteerism. The magnitude of
the di¤erence between estimators is comparable to other studies that use an
29In a meta-analysis of the estimates to the return to education, Ashenfelter, Harmon,




How do parent volunteers increase test scores? From recent research
on education, it is clear that the role unobservables in education production,
attainment, and outcome is signicant (Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek,
1999; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005). This is no less the case for classroom
parent volunteering. Classroom volunteers bring an extraordinary amount
of unobservables into the education production function that on average
positively a¤ects test scores.
An implication of these results is that volunteer and mentor programs
are a key element in raising test scores. The stereotype that children of parent
volunteers have higher test scores solely because of extra e¤ort spent at home is
false. However, the di¢ culty in exogenously placing volunteers into classrooms
is that unobservables may not necessarily accompany a mandated volunteer.
Requiring volunteerism might transform volunteering into a paid activity with
similarly returns, and an example of such are private school programs that
require volunteering in exchange for a tuition reduction.
Parental investment in early education is an important determinant of
future earnings of students. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) found that one-
half of the inter-generational correlation in earnings is accounted for by parent
investment in education, in particular early education.As shown here, par-
ent volunteers not only increase the real academic achievement level of their
child but also the perceived achievement level. This combined e¤ect in early




Household Bargaining over the
Savings Rate
4.1 Introduction
There are a variety of microeconomic models that explain household decisions
of consumption and saving. These models incorporate ideas about life-cycle
income and wealth, attitudes toward risk, and discount factors.1 Tradition-
ally, researchers have assumed that household members choose the amount of
household savings as a collective body. However, as it has become evident
that household members have conicting preferences, there have been a num-
ber of attempts to analyze household savings decisions from the perspective
of bargaining models.
We exploit a unique data set from South Korea in which we know both
total household savings and also about the distribution of savings over house-
1See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a survey of the literature.
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hold membersseparate nancial accounts. This unique feature of the data
set reects a peculiar institutional framework in South Korea. In South Ko-
rea, joint accounts are virtually non-existent; each individual has their own
account. Secondly, South Korean law requires that each account be associated
with a persons name, thus emphasizes the individuality of nancial proper-
ties and transactions. Lastly, South Korean divorce law is based on a separate
property system. This system guarantees ones right to assets in his or her
name in the event of a divorce. These institutional characteristics provide a
unique context for analyzing household savings decisions from the perspective
of household bargaining.
We nd that households where wives have more bargaining power, wives
save more in absolute terms, and they also save more in their accounts relative
to their husbands. This nding is consistent with the observation that women
prefer to save more than men and hence, seek more control over household
nances. The unitary household model, where household members combine
their incomes and maximize a common utility function, cannot explain our
ndings.
The remainder of our work is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews
the related literature, Section 4.3 describes the data set and the institutional
framework in South Korea, and Section 4.4 presents a conceptual model and




Household members have di¤erent preferences over household savings, and
they reconcile these di¤erences through a decision-making process. Men and
women di¤er by risk aversion, prudence, self-control, and discount rates; these
are all known as standard determinants of household savings. Barber and
Odean (2001) show that men are more condent in nancial matters than
women. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) nd that single men are less risk
averse than single women in nancial decisions. Thomas (1990) nds that
women prefer to save more and that unearned income the hands of a mother
has a larger e¤ect on children than in the hands of the father. Because women
on average live longer, women also have a lower discount rate than men. For
the various reasons given above, women have a higher propensity to save than
men.2
It follows from gender di¤erences in preferences that the balance of bar-
gaining power within households a¤ects household saving decisions. Using the
gender longevity gap, Browning (2000) shows theoritically that wives save more
in households where they have strong decision-making power. In his Nash bar-
gaining model, the husbands savings decreases as the wifes bargaining power
increases, but total household savings increases because the wifes savings in-
creases enough to o¤set the decrease in the husbands savings. Nargis (2003)
tests these predictions with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). She
nds that total household savings increases with the wifes bargaining power,
as measured by relative earnings. Similarly, Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000)
2As high private savings rates are an important engine for economic growth, this obser-
vation is often cited as evidence that female empowerment fosters economic development in
developing countries. For example, East Asian countries save more than 30 percent of gross
national disposable income, while African countries save less than 15 percent.
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show that wives with stronger bargaining power accumulate more net wealth
as they approach retirement. They measure the balance of power by a spouses
relative control over income sources, relative age, and relative education.
Recent studies use information about between-spouse di¤erences in pref-
erences to understand the underlying household savings decision-making process.
Mazzocco (2004) approximates spousal di¤erences in attitudes toward risk by
using survey questions about lotteries in the Health and Retirement Study.
Lich-Tyler (2003) uses subjective questions in the PSID to measure di¤er-
ences in time preferences between spouses. Lich-Tyler nds that bargaining
power, measured by the relative education of a spouses father, determines
how di¤erences in preferences are resolved within households.
Other studies use direct questions about the internal decision-making
process for nancial matters. With the British Household Panel Survey, Dobbel-
steen and Kooreman (1997) exploit various questions about family nancial
organization and decision-makers for nancial issues to show that decision-
making power in nancial management depends on bargaining power. Simi-
larly, for Canadian couples, Woolley (2000) nds that bargaining power de-
termines not only who manages household nances, but whose name is on the
household bank account. To our knowledge there is no study, however, about
the distribution of household savings over individual accounts.
4.3 Data
The data set we use is from the Korean Household Panel Study (KHPS).
Conducted by the Daewoo Research Institute, the KHPS is the rst panel
survey of South Korean households. It is structured similarly to the PSID,
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and the data are available from 1993 until 1998. We exclude households in
which the husband is not identied as the head of the household, does not
work for pay, or is more than 65 years old. We also exclude households with
zero savings and with earners that are neither the husband nor wife.
A unique feature of the data set is that the survey asked about total
household savings and the distribution of household savings over individual
accounts. Beginning in 1995, the survey asked about individual holdings of
bank and nancial assets. In 1995, the question about individual holdings
was, How much did you save monthly in bank accounts on average in 1994?
In 1996, respondents were asked about their accumulated stock of nancial
assets.3 In 1997, the survey emphasized savings in individual accounts by ex-
plicitly asking, How much did you save monthly under your name on average
in last year?We use the 1997 data because of the emphasis on individual
accounts. The sample size for this year is 1,041 couples.4
Another unique feature of the data set is the peculiar institutional
framework of South Korea. The use of joint accounts is rare in South Korea.
The reason for the absence of joint accounts is not well known; only recently
have some banks begun to o¤er joint spousal accounts.5 A real-name nancial
3The same question in 1995 asked about ows of nancial assets.
4We do not use observations for 1998 because that year several major commercial banks
declared bankruptcy due to the Asian nancial crisis.
5We found no denitive statistic regarding the absence of joint accounts. We did, how-
ever, visit with an accounting professor at a South Korean university, a senior researcher at
the South Korean central bank, and a former employee at a national bank in South Korea
about the absence of joint accounts. Each conrmed that nancial accounts with joint legal
status do not exist in South Korea. Moreover, joint accounts are becoming less popular in
developed countries. The proportion of married women in the U.S. who keep checking or
savings accounts in their own names is increasing (Treas, 1993). A survey on joint accounts
conducted by the Abbey National Bank of the United Kingdom nds that women are more
reluctant than men to have a joint account (Women More Reluctant to Have Joint Bank
Account,Press Association, June 10, 2003). Reasons for not wanting a joint account in-
clude: uncertainty in the relationship (57%), to avoid arguments (48%), and lack of trust
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transaction law, legislated in 1993, requires that any nancial account must be
registered under a persons real name. This law also prohibits the accessibility
to ones nancial assets by others, even if they are family members.6 In this
institutional framework, with no joint accounts and limited access to others
accounts, couples must decide on whose account to deposit household savings.
Descriptive statistics about these data are presented in Table 4.1. Earn-
ings and savings are denominated in 10,000 South Korean won and for an
average month. During this time period, 10,000 won was roughly equivalent
to about 10 United States dollars. For all households, the average monthly
earnings for husbands is about 8 times larger than wives average monthly
earnings. After removing wives who do not work for pay (see Column Full-
time workers), the average month earnings for husbands is about 2 time larger
than wivesaverage monthly earnings.
The savings rate is dened as the ratio of savings to earnings. The
average household savings rate is about 30 percent; this is similar to the na-
tional savings rate published by the South Korean national statistics bureau.
We cannot use disposable income since information on tax payments and all
sources of non-labor income is not available. Most households save more in the
husbands bank account than in the wifes bank account. The average hold-
ings for husbands is about 35 percent larger than their wives. For two-earner
households, there is no savings gap. About 40 percent of wives do not have
an account. It is also notable that in single-earner households wives save more
that their partner or spouse will use the money sensibly (27%). The Bank reports that 30
percent of couples in the UK have a joint account.
6Civic organizations and womens rights advocates are critical about the restricted access
to family membersaccounts. They argue that the law should allow one to inquire about
his or her partners accounts to prevent the partner from hiding marital assets in the event
of a divorce.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics1
All households Full-time workers
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Individual savings 38:0 28:2 40:5 41:4
(41:6) (41:9) (44:8) (52:1)
Household savings 66:1 81:9
(54:0) (61:9)
Wifes share of savings (%) 40:8 49:3
(41:2) (39:4)
Individual earnings 201 25:7 175 86:5
(91:9) (50:5) (81:5) (63:7)
Household earnings 226 261
(102) (119)
Wifes share of earnings (%) 9:7 32:2
(16:8) (15:9)
Age 39:9 36:6 40:7 37:2
(7:4) (7:0) (7:5) (6:9)
Education (years of schooling) 12:6 11:6 12:3 11:2
(2:8) (2:6) (2:8) (2:6)
Number of children 1:8 1:8
(0:7) (0:9)
Metropolitan residence 0:6 0:6
(0:5) (0:5)
Spearman correlation  0:4  0:4
[p < 0:01] [p < 0:01]
N = 1; 041 213
1 Standard deviations are in parentheses. Earnings and savings are in terms of
10,000 South Korean won. Spearman correlation is the test statistic of testing for
the independence between spousessavings.
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than what they earn. This suggests that part of the husbands earnings are
transferred to the wifes bank account. There is a positive correlation between
savings and the distribution of income between spouses.
In the event of a divorce, the separate property system gives individ-
uals ownership of accounts in their name. Property which is obtained before
marriage or obtained under a specic name during marriage belongs to that
individual (Korean Civil Law, Article 830, Clause 1).7 Although the spouse
may request that the assets be divided (Korean Civil Law, Article 839, Clause
2), researchers nd that when a judge further divides the assets that the wifes
contribution to household wealth is underestimated if she does not work for pay
(Lee, 1990; Won, 1992; Cho and Chun, 2004). Furthermore, the law cannot
prevent husbands from disposing or holding back household property under
their name before a divorce (Cho and Chun, 2004). The South Korean legal
environment is an important reason why the division of household savings over
individual accounts is a function of household bargaining.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Conceptual Model
The unitary household model assumes that individual members pool their
incomes and maximizes a single utility function. For simplicity, consider a two-
period model of consumption and savings. According to the unitary model,
7In other words, property accumulated after marriage, and held under an individuals
name, is the property of that individual.
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each household maximizes the following utility function:
V (ch1 ; c
w





where  is a household discount factor, V is the household utility function,
and cjt is consumption of spouse j at time t. For periods 1 and 2, the binding










h + sw) + yh1 + y
w
1 ;
where yjt is the earnings of spouse j at time t, r is the gross interest rate, and
sj is the savings in the account of that spouse. In the unitary model, only
the sum of individual savings is chosen. Total savings depends on household
income, the gross interest rate, and preferences including the discount factor.
Secondly, only the sum of individual earnings matters in determining total
savings. This is also known as the income-pooling hypothesis.
Now consider a simple household bargaining model where each spouse
has a potentially di¤erent set of preferences. Dene individual utility as u(cjt).
The utility function is egoistic in that it depends on the individuals own
consumption. In each period spouses divide total income into consumption
and savings. We assume that spouses can divorce each other in the second
period with probability p. In the event of a divorce each spouse keeps what
is in his or her own account. Otherwise, total savings are divided between
spouses. We assume that a household decision is on the ex-ante Pareto frontier
(Mazzocco, 2004). From this it follows that we can represent the households
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optimization problem in the rst period as:
[uw(cw1 ) + 
w(p  uw(cwD2 ) + (1  p)  uw(cwM2 ))] + (4.3)
(1  )[uh(ch1) + h(p  uh(chD2 ) + (1  p)  uh(chM2 ))];
where  denotes the wifes relative bargaining power, 0 <  < 1, cjD2 is the
consumption of spouse j if he divorces in the second period and cjM2 is the
consumption of spouse j if he remains married in the second period.8 If a
couples divorces, then each consumes his own income and savings, cjD =
yj2 + rs
j.
Households choose not only total savings, but also the distribution of
savings over individual accounts, and consumption. Let s denote total savings
and  denote the wifes relative share of savings, sw=s. Assuming an interior




uh0(yh2 + (1  )rs)
uw0(yw2 + rs)
: (4.4)
This solution shows that if there is a positive probability of divorce, spouses
save more in their own accounts. How successful spouses are at saving in their
own account depends on the balance of bargaining power.9 As  increases
in equation 4.4, conditional on s;  increases, and vice versa.10 Unlike the
8We exclude the case of  = 0 or  =1 in which the bargaining model simplies into the
unitary model.
9If we allow for divorce in the unitary model, then we need a decision-making process
for the division of savings, and thus the model is no longer a model of a unitary household.
10If  also a¤ects total savings, then the e¤ect of  on  is ambiguous. The sign depends
on ds=d and wuw00(cwD2 ) (1 )(1 )huh00(chD2 ). However, if  increases total savings
and  and  are relatively small the e¤ect is likely to be positive. These assumptions are
reasonable because women are willing to save more and in South Korea a wife has little
bargaining power.
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unitary model, total savings depends on the balance of power because spouses
have di¤erent preferences. For example, if the wife has a low discount rate,
she prefers to save more. Note that this prediction holds even if there is no
possibility of divorce.
In the above model, bargaining power is given exogenously. However,
individual savings also a¤ects bargaining power. Cartwright, Khandker, and
Pitt (2003) nd that a wifes nancial autonomy increases her bargaining power
over household expenditures. Spouses can use savings in their own accounts
for private consumption without being monitored by their partners. Anderson
and Baland (2002) show that wives use nancial control to protect house-
hold resources from their husbandssquanderings. If individual savings a¤ects
bargaining power then spouses prefer to save more in their accounts, ceteris
paribus. This prediction also holds if there is no possibility of divorce.
Another factor that a¤ects the division of savings even in the context of
the unitary model, which the above models do not account for, is transaction
costs. For example, when only one spouse works for pay, the other spouse may
specialize in domestic tasks including the management of household nances.
It is more e¢ cient to open a bank account in the name of the spouse who
is responsible for nancial management than in the name of the spouse who
works for pay (Treas, 1993). In doing so, couples minimize transaction costs by
increasing the nancial managers access to household resources. Dobbelsteen




To test the unitary and the bargaining household model, we estimate a system
of simultaneous equations for total household savings and its division over
individual accounts:
si = 0 + 1i + 2yi +X
0
i3 + ui (4.5)
i = 0 + 1i + 2yi +X
0
i3 + vi (4.6)









i ): A vector of individual and household characteristics, Xi,
includes spousesage and education, the number of children, and an indicator
for urban residence. The variable i is a proxy of the wifes relative bargain-
ing power. We jointly estimate these equations by the seemingly unrelated
regression method, which allows the error terms, ui and vi; to be arbitrarily
correlated. The unitary model states that bargaining power does not a¤ect
savings or the share of savings: 1 = 1 = 0.
The e¤ect of i on i; however, is valid only after conditioning  on
total savings, si. To include this assumption we consider a two-stage decision-
making procedure in which households decide total savings and then, condi-
tional on total savings, allocate total savings over individual accounts. We
estimate this decision by two-stage least squares. This is given by:




i3 + ui (4.7)
i = 0 + 1si + 2i +W
0
i3 + vi; (4.8)
whereWi is a set of control variables and Zi is a set of instruments for si that
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a¤ects total savings but does not a¤ect the wifes share of savings.
A di¢ culty in estimating the above is nding a suitable proxy for bar-
gaining power. First, we use the ratio of the wifes earnings to total household






i ). Relative earnings are a measure of bargain-
ing power since they measure ones contribution to household resources.11 A
womans access to employment outside the home also increases her domestic
decision-making power. Basu (2007) argues that a wifes bargaining power
should come from what she actually earns as well as her wage rate. A wifes
labor supply, however, also a¤ects the threat point because female career inter-
ruptions during marriage diminish human capital and job opportunities after
divorce.
Critics of relative spousal earnings as a measure of bargaining power
note that a spouses labor income is the product of the wage rate and hours
worked. If consumption and leisure are not separable in preferences then
the coe¢ cient on i captures the direct e¤ect of labor supply and leisure on
consumption, and thereby also on savings (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). For
example, when a wife works for pay in the labor market, her shadow price of
working at home increases. As a result, ceteris paribus consumption is higher
and savings is lower. This correlation of preferences confounds the e¤ects of
bargaining power. Another criticism of relative earnings is that they do not
acknowledge the value of home production. Pollak (2005) points out that
earnings within a marriage are not a good proxy for potential earnings outside
a marriage because labor supply is endogenous to household production.
To address the problem of endogenous labor supply, we follow the lit-
11For papers that use relative earnings as a proxy for bargaining power see Phipps and
Burton (1992), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Browning et al. (1998), Lundberg and Ward-
Batts (2000), Woolley (2000), and Nargis (2003).
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erature and restrict the sample to households in which both spouses work 35
hours or longer (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992; Browning, Bourguignon,
Chiappori, and Lechene, 1994). This mitigates the substitution e¤ect between
consumption and labor supply. Married womens labor force participation in
the full sample is quite low, thus restricting the sample to only households
where both spouses work may signicantly lessens the endogeneity of relative
earnings.
We also use non-labor income from non-bank nancial assets as an al-
ternative proxy for bargaining power. In 1996, the KHPS asked individuals
about their holdings of various nancial assets other than savings, such as
insurance, equity, bonds, and private loans. In 1997, however, there is no in-
formation about spousesnon-labor income. We use the wifes relative holdings
of non-bank nancial assets in 1996 as a measure of bargaining power. This
measure may be a better proxy of bargaining power than relative earnings be-
cause we better avoid the endogeneity of recent labor supply (Thomas, 1990).
Non-labor income is still not completely free from the endogeneity problem
of labor supply because non-labor income is an accumulation of past earnings
and savings decisions (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003).
4.5 Results
Table 4.2 presents the results when we use the wifes relative earnings as an
indicator for her relative bargaining power (see equations 4.7 and 4.8). We nd
that as the wifes relative earnings increases, total household savings increases.
A standard-deviation increase in the wifes relative earnings increases house-
hold savings by about 9 percent. The e¤ect of relative earnings on the wifes
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share of savings is also signicant. A standard-deviation increase in the wifes
relative earnings increases her share of savings by 17 percent. As expected, an
increase in total earnings increases household savings. Holding the wifes rel-
ative earnings constant, a 10 percent increase in total earnings increases total
savings by about 3 percent. The wifes relative earnings might be correlated
with higher-order terms of total earnings and the savings rate might change
over income levels. To allow for these possibilities, we include the square of
total earnings. This higher-order term, however, is not statistically signicant.
The last two columns in Table 4.2 present the results for full-time workers. As
before, the wifes relative earnings increases both total savings and her relative
share of savings. A standard-deviation increase in the wifes relative earnings
increases household savings by 16 percent and the wifes share by about 22
percent. Decisions about household savings are more sensitive to spouse rela-
tive earnings when both spouses are full-time workers.12 In Table 4.3 we use
non-labor income as an alternative measure of bargaining power. We use the
spousal di¤erence rather than the ratio because many couples do not have
nancial assets other than bank savings. In addition, we include the total
amount of nancial assets and accumulated individual savings for each spouse
in the previous year to control for heterogeneity in preferences. An increase
in the wifes relative non-labor income increases her share of savings but it
does not a¤ect total savings. Along with non-labor income, we also include
the wifes relative earnings and obtain similar results. The unitary model does
not explain these results. Even if relative earnings do not represent bargaining
power, the unitary model predicts that individual earnings do not inuence
12Tax incentives to smooth holdings over individual bank accounts for two-earner couples
do not exist during this period. Income taxes were levied on the sum of spousesearnings.
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household decisions, controlling for total earnings and the endogeneity of labor
supply. These data show, however, that individual earnings do not a¤ect the
household decision over savings. Table 4.4 shows results from the two-stage
least squares estimation (see equations 8 and 9). Based on our ndings in Ta-
ble 4.2, we use total earnings, total earnings squared, and number of children
as instruments for total savings. The Anderson test shows that these instru-
mental variables are relevant, and the Sargan test shows that they are valid.13
The wifes relative earnings increases both total savings and the wifes relative
share of savings. We nd, however, that total savings does not directly a¤ect
the wifes share of savings.
13The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the rst stage. The test statistic is












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The recent development of household bargaining models focuses on collective
labor supply and household consumption. Our paper extends the scope of
bargaining models to household savings over individual accounts. Exploiting
a unique data set from and institutional framework in South Korea, we ana-
lyze the determinants of household savings at the spouse level. Our ndings
indicate that the balance of power between spouses plays a signicant role in
determining the intra-household distribution of savings as well as the overall
level of household savings. These results also support previous ndings that
women have a higher propensity to save than men. These results extend to
countries other than South Korea. In spite of strong traditional gender roles in
South Korea that might discourage joint household decisions, we nd strong
evidence that household savings is decided through a bargaining framework.
Given these constraints on acceptable behaviors, couples in less rigid societies
are likely to have a higher incidence of household bargaining over nancial




For centuries, households have been the fundamental unit of society. In the
above chapters, I have discussed and presented evidence on their allocation
of time and goods, the productivity of donations of household time, and the
process by which they come to a consensus on household decisions. As good
research becomes the foundation for future work and ideas, hopefully the ideas
in these chapters will leads others to the next question, the next paper, and
the next contribution to society.
In summary, in the second chapter I found that the time and goods cost
of a child is large much larger than the goods cost only. With the wage as
the price of leisure and the price of child care at 1/3 of the market cost for
child care, the quarterly cost of a child for a single mother is $7,000. This is
seven times the cost of a child calculated with only household expenditures on
goods. Time rather than goods is the larger cost of raising children.
In Chapter 3, The Return to Donations of Time, I found that the in-
strumented return to volunteering for reading test scores is a 12 percentile
increase and the non-instrumented return to volunteering is 2.5 percentile in-
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crease. This large di¤erence in the estimates is simply because volunteering
is a very endogenous activity. Parent volunteers not only increase the real
academic achievement level of their child but also the perceived achievement
level as measured by subjective teacher assessments. The impact of volunteer
and mentor programs is more than an urban legend.
In the nal chapter, my coauthor and I found that the balance of power
between spouses plays a signicant role in determining the intra-household
distribution of savings as well as the overall level of household savings. These




A.1 Cost of Children on the Construction of
Price Levels
A.1.1 Geographical Information for Respondents in the
CPI, ATUS, and CEX
1. CPI: For roughly each good in the CPI, the BLS publishes monthly area
indices for the US: four regions (Northeast, Midwest, (formerly North
Central), South, and West), three population size-classes (A, B/C, and
D) and ten region-by-size groups (Northeast-Size Class A, South-Size
Class D, etc.). The A population size class represents all metropoli-
tan areas over 1.5 million people, B/C represents mid-sized and small
metropolitan areas (fewer than 1.5 million), and D represents all non-
metropolitan urban areas. Due to insu¢ cient sample sizes, region-by-
size indices are not published for Northeast and West Size Class D. In
addition, the BLS publishes CPI information for 26 metropolitan areas
monthly, bimonthly, or semi-annually. Some of these metropolitan areas,
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as dened by the Bureau of the Census, include suburbs or counties that
extend across state boundaries.
2. ATUS: For each respondent, the ATUS has the following information
about their residence: metropolitan status, region, and state. Though
the ATUS sample is from the out-going rotation of the CPS, more de-
tailed geographical information is not available. Specically, the fol-
lowing variables, though available in the CPS, are not available in the
ATUS: CMSA FIPS code, MSA/PSMA code, County code, Central
City/Balance Status, Individual Central City, MSA/PMSA Size, and
CMSA/MSA Size. Matching individuals from the ATUS to the original
CPS (and not the CPS les packaged with the ATUS data set) to get
more geographical information is possible, however, to get more detailed
information on a respondents residence.
3. CES: For each respondent, the CES has the following information about
their residence: metropolitan status, region, state, population size (5
categories), and urban/rural. The CPI has information by three types
of city size, four regions, regions by city size, and select metropolitan
cities. A metropolitan city is dened by the O¢ ce of Management and
Budget. These cities are called MSAs or Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
Size class A and B/C are MSAs with populations large than 1,500,000
people and between 50,000 and 1,500,000, respectively. Size class D are
non-MSA cities and population areas under 50,000.
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A.1.2 Consumer Price Index
Prices, or price indices when prices are not available, are critical pieces of
information to estimate a demand system. Commonly used prices indices
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) describe price variation across time
within areas (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004a, pg. 6). If prices are too similar
or do not vary, then the Hessian can not be inverted and demand estimates
can not be obtained. Because I use only one year of the CEX, these indices
do not have enough variation to estimate a demand system. In order to have
more price variation, I construct indices that are comparable across areas and
time by using the price levels constructed by Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton
(1994) and the CPI price indices from 1989 to 2003.
Since 1913 BLS produced price indices have been available for various
goods and regions.1 To create the index, BLS agents rst collect price in-
formation on goods throughout the county. In addition to price information,
agents also collect large amounts of information about the product such as:
size, quality, brand name, and packaging of the good. The BLS decides what
goods to sample from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which is a snapshot
of what consumer units are purchasing. With these weights, the BLS cre-
ates price indices for 95 percent of the items that consumers purchase. The
constructed price index from these data on goods prices is comparable only
within areas. For example, suppose in 2001 that the price index for bread in
Austin, Texas is 125 and that the price index for bread in Fairfax, Virginia is
120. In the following year suppose that the indices increase by 10 points in
1See Kokoski (1991) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004a, pg. 7) for a brief history of
BLS and interarea price indices, and overview of approach to creating interarea indices from
intertemporal price indices.
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: It is a true statement that the price of bread rose faster in
Fairfax than in Austin, however, because of how these indices are constructed,
it is not true that bread in Fairfax is the same price as bread in Austin
although the indices are the same. To begin to make the later statement, we
need information on price levels. These price indices only give information on
the rates of change. In addition to not being able to compare indices across
areas, it is also not possible to compare goods within an area.
Kokoski, Cardi¤, and Moulton (1994) create area comparable price in-
dices for June 1987-June 1988 from information available to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS has price, quality, and quantity informa-
tion for the goods that are components of each of the indices it creates. To
mitigate these product di¤erence across areas, Kokoski et al. use a linear pro-
jection of the price of the good on characteristics of the goods and areas.2
The coe¢ cients on the area covariates identify price di¤erences by area. With
estimates from those regressions, and some normalizations, they construct a
price index that is comparable across areas for June 1987-June 1988. This
regression methodology is known as the County-Product-Dummy regression.
Summers (1973) proposed this method to compare di¤erent baskets of goods
across countries.
Kokoski et al. provide a wealth of information from the BLS database,
via estimates from County-Product-Dummy regressions. They report inter-
area comparable price levels for aggregate good groups as well as some select
2See also Kokoski, Moulton, and Zieschang (1996).
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subgroups.3 For each good group, price levels are available for the dened
CPI areas in 1988/89. The price levels they report cover 75% of household
expenditures.
To construct 2003 price levels, I scale the 1988/89 price levels, provided
by Kokoski et al., by the change in prices from 1988/89 to 2003 as reported
in the CPI.4 Due to changes in demographics, available products, and con-
sumer purchasing bundles, the BLS made numerous changes in the BLS/CPI
denitions of areas and goods. Many of the area denitions in 1988/89 are
aggregated in the 2003 denitions as adjacent cities grow into one larger city.
Similarly, in 2003, many more goods are available to the household than in
1988/89. New goods and areas in 2003 are linked to similar goods and areas in
1988/89. For both new goods and new area denitions, the variation in price
comes mostly from ination rather than from di¤erences in price levels.5
The scaling of 1988/89 to 2003 prices indices is:
pricelevelij2003 =
 




where i is a good and j is a area. Note that i and j may be di¤erent in 2003
and in 1988/89 because of changes in the item and area denitions. Because
of new good denitions and the discontinuance of other goods, a price index
series may not exist from 1988 to 2003. In this case, I piece together changes
3The major good groups that I use are: alcohol, enterainment, mens apparel, boys
apparel, womens apparel, girls apparel, infants apparel, footwear, rent (for rentors and
owners equivalent), professional medical services, household furnishings, food at home, and
food away, utilities, private transportation. For more detail on the denition of these groups,
see the BLS/CPI good denitions for 1988=89:
4I use the CPI-U index not adjusted for seasonality.
5Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) use a similar mapping of goods into recent good deni-
tions. The authors, however, look only at national price indices and hence do not map area
denitions.
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in prices rst from similar areas, and then second from similar goods.6
Price Merging
Matching goods I match the goods in the CPI with the goods in the CEX.
Because the construction of the CPI is based on weights obtained from the
CEX, many goods are similarly dened.
Matching areas The ATUS, CEX, and CPI each have di¤erent amounts
of information about respondentsplace of residence. All data sets identify
metropolitan status and state of residence of the respondent, unless censored
for condentiality reasons. Thus, for each combination of metropolitan status
and state I construct weighted price levels by the population density of each
state.
From the Census Bureau I gather the July 1999 population densities
for each state: metropolitan, non-metropolitan, MSA, CMSA, and PMSA. All
of the MSAs dened in the 2003 CPI are similarly dened in the 1999 Census
except for Boston-Brockton-Nashua which is dened in the Census as Boston-
Worcester-Lawrence. I assume that these areas are roughly the same. An
MSA in the CPI may cross multiple states. I separate these MSAs, one for
each state. Similarly, the Census divides the population of MSAs that are in
multiple states into the amount that falls into each state.
From the Census Bureau I have information on all MSAs in a state,
the percent of the states population in each MSA, and the percent of the
population not in the MSA. To create prices indices by state and metropolitan
6About half of the areas dened in 1988 are similarly dened in 2003. The majority of




A  a+B  b+MSA1 msa1 +MSA2 msa2 +MSA3 msa3






where i is a good, s is a state, A; B; and D are size prices, a; b; and d are
the percentage of the population that live in those areas, respectively. If an
MSA has no corresponding CPI information, and it is larger than 1.25 million
people, then it is included in a, otherwise metropolitan areas are included in b:7
If information on an MSA is available, then the related population is removed
from either a or b as appropriate. Non-metropolitan populations of the state
are placed in d. If a region does not have a size D; I use the next larger size.
No state has more than three MSAs reported in the CPI.
When necessary to maintain condentiality, information on the state of
residence is missing in the CEX. When this is the case, I use region of residence
instead. The price index I use for these cases is
pricei;s;metro =







where a and b are the percent of the population that lives in Metropolitan
Inside Central City and Metropolitan Outside Central City respectively. The
non-metro price are those who live in Non-metropolitan areas.
7The 2003 CPI denes Size A and B as metropolitan areas. Size As are population areas
greater than 1.5 million people. Size Bs are population areas less than 1.5 million people.
To make 2003 population sizes relative to 1999 populations I assume a population growth
rate of about 4 1/2%, which backs out from a 1999 population size of 1.25 million people.
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A.2 Volunteering
A.2.1 Questions About Volunteering in the First Grade
Teacher Questionnaire A
 How often do children in your class who need more help with reading
receive the following kinds of services while at school? (Never, Less than
once a week, Once or twice a week, 3 or 4 times a week, Daily; Minutes
per session.)
 Individual tutoring from an aide or volunteer
 In a typical week, about how many total hours do volunteer(s) assist
with your class? If there are two or more volunteers please add up their
weekly totals. (Total number of hours per week.)
 How many hours a week do volunteers usually assist in your class in the
following ways?
Working directly with children on instructional tasks
Doing noninstructional work (e.g., photocopying, preparing mate-
rials, etc.)
 What percent of children in your class have parents who participate in
the following activities? (None, 1-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-100%)




 During this school year, have this childs parents/guardians participated
in the following activities? (Yes, No, Not Applicable/Not O¤ered)
Volunteered to help in your classroom or school
Parent Questionnaire
 Since the beginning of this school year have you or the other adults in
your household . . . Volunteered at the school or served on a committee?
(Attended? Who did this? (i.e. mom, dad, step-mom, etc.))
School Administrator Questionnaire
 What percent of children in the school have parents who participate in
the following activities? (None, 1-25%, 26-50%, 51-75% ,76-100%)
Volunteer regularly to help in the classroom or another part of the
school
Full Set of Control Variables
 School Conference with Parent, Send Home Things to Parent, and Share
Portfolio with Parents
 Class Minority, Number of Paid Aides, Total Class Enrollment, and Ra-
tio of Girls to Boys, and Ratio of New to Total Students
 Student Participates in School-based Title 1 Math Program, Individual
Tutoring Math Program, and Small Pull-Out Math Group
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 Teacher Non-White, and Number of Years Teaching at this School and
Years as School Teacher
 Teacher and Teaching Aides Education Certications
 Teacher hours of paid and unpaid preparation time
 Interval between assessments (days), spring (1st) - spring (K)
 Family composition and Mothers age
 Number of siblings, Sibling squared, and Sibling cubed
 Number of times parent tells story to child, reads book to child, and
spanked child last week
 Mother and fathers work hours and employment status
 Mother and fathers level of education
 Socio-economic status measure
 Classroom average mother and fathers level of education
 Classroom average mother and fathers occupation score
 Classroom average socio-economic status measure
 Outside of school activities
 Child reads to self outside of school and uses computer for education
purposes outside of school
 Parent has library card, Child has library card
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